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THE COST OF CONSENT: OPTIMAL STANDARDIZATION IN 
THE LAW OF CONTRACT 
Joshua Fairfield* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article argues that informed consent to contract terms is not a good to 
be maximized, but an information cost that courts should minimize.  As a 
result, courts ought to minimize the cost sum of information costs and 
contractual surprise.  The Article applies information-cost theory to show that 
information-forcing rules are often inefficient at both the micro- and 
macroeconomic levels.  Such rules also impose greater costs on third parties 
than the benefits they create for the contracting parties.  When one consumer 
creates an idiosyncratic deal, the information-savings benefits of 
standardization are reduced for all other potential consumers.  The Article 
demonstrates that in some cases courts are already abandoning a rigid view of 
contractual consent when consent is too costly; but that under other doctrines, 
courts insist on an inefficient level of informed contractual consent. 
 
 
 * Joshua Fairfield, Associate Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law.  Thanks 
to the Frances Lewis Law Center for generous funding and the opportunity to present these ideas.  Thanks to 
Michael Klausner, Avery Katz, Randy Barnett, David Millon, Louise Halper, Michael Anderson, Mark Hall, 
Jeff Stake, Joe Perillo, Samuel Allen, and Ken Dau-Schmidt for comments and suggestions.  Thank you to 
Michael Gaffney, Ketan Patel, and Steve Mammarella for invaluable research assistance.  Thanks to Tom 
Merrill and Michael Heller for the conversations, out of which this Article arose.  Any errors are entirely mine. 
FAIRFIELD GALLEYFINAL 6/2/2009  12:28:13 PM 
1402 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 1403 
 I. LITERATURE ..................................................................................... 1405 
A. Liberal Contract Theory ........................................................... 1406 
B. Boilerplate and Coasean Bargains .......................................... 1409 
C. Information Costs in Property .................................................. 1415 
 II. THE COST OF CONSENT .................................................................... 1422 
A. Limits and Definitions .............................................................. 1423 
B. Transaction Costs and Consent ................................................ 1425 
C. Illustrating the Cost of Consent ................................................ 1427 
 III. THE BENEFITS OF STANDARDIZATION .............................................. 1431 
A. Contract Information Externalities .......................................... 1432 
1. Customization Increases Information Costs to Third 
Parties ................................................................................ 1432 
2. Standardization Lowers Information Costs for Third 
Parties ................................................................................ 1435 
B. Direct Benefits of Standardization to Consumers .................... 1435 
C. Courts and Standardization ...................................................... 1438 
1. The Numerus Clausus in Contract ..................................... 1439 
a. The Statute of Frauds and Parol Evidence .................. 1439 
b. Trade Use and Industry Custom and Practice ............. 1441 
c. Standard Default Terms ............................................... 1441 
d. The Battle of the Forms ............................................... 1443 
e. Limited Corporate Forms ............................................ 1444 
2. Standardization Through Anti-Standardization Doctrines . 1445 
 IV. CHALLENGES: STANDARDIZATION AND INNOVATION ...................... 1451 
A. Micro-Modularity ..................................................................... 1452 
B. Macro-Modularity .................................................................... 1453 
 V. PROPOSED CHANGES ........................................................................ 1456 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 1457 
FAIRFIELD GALLEYFINAL 6/2/2009  12:28:13 PM 
2009] THE COST OF CONSENT 1403 
“DAD! Too. Much. Information!” 
—Author’s daughter, age 6. 
INTRODUCTION 
In contract theory, consent is indispensable and standardization 
disfavored.1  In practice, consent is costly, and standardization is the solution.  
This Article attempts to realign contract law with the broader discourse on 
standardization.  It argues that contractual consent is an information cost and 
proposes that standardization is the way to reduce that cost. 
Traditional theories of contract treat consent as an indispensable expression 
of will, of autonomy, or as a vital element of an ongoing relationship.  
Economic theories of contract, especially those in the Coasean tradition, have 
treated consent as incidental to negotiation over contract defaults.  The 
Coasean bargain requires that a contracting party be able to gain its 
counterparty’s contractual consent with minimal transaction costs.2  As a 
result, economists have not strongly focused on consent as a transaction cost, 
and almost none have focused on it as an information cost.3 
Traditional contract theories malign standardized contracts for increasing 
information costs.4  The usual argument is that standardized contracts hide or 
backload terms, confuse consumers, and raise the costs of information.5  But 
 
 1 See Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 900 (1994) (“Consent is the 
master concept that defines the law of contracts in the United States. . . .  [It] expresses the primacy of 
individualistic values in our culture.  To say that one cannot be bound by a promise that one did not voluntarily 
and knowingly make is to say that the individual should be the author of her own undertakings . . . .”).  For an 
in-depth discussion of the role of consent in contracting, see Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay 
in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1179–80 (1983). 
 2 See David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction 
Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61, 68 (2005) (“Coase claimed that absent 
transaction costs, parties could simply bargain around an inefficient decision made by a court . . . .”). 
 3 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate 
Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 715–16 (1997) (“[W]e present a 
theoretical, institutional, and empirical analysis of two independent, but conceptually related, forces that 
influence the balance of standardization, customization, and innovation in contracts: learning externalities and 
network externalities.”). 
 4 See Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REV. 73, 105–06 
(2006) (“Courts, therefore, may apply unconscionability as a substitute for market correction prevented by 
sellers’ monopoly power and purchasers’ high information costs.  In this way, unconscionability provides 
courts with means for checking whether contracts are truly products of contractual liberty.”). 
 5 Standardization has two meanings, rarely distinguished.  The first refers to a drafter repeatedly offering 
the same contractual terms to all potential counterparties.  For example, a widget manufacturer might offer the 
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everywhere else that standardization is studied (for example, standardization in 
industrial manufacture, computer programming, or medical consent), 
standardization lowers the cost of information.6  Thus, the anti-standardization 
doctrines of adhesion and unconscionability seem adrift in an age of 
mechanized production and electronic contracting. 
A simple example shows why the leading views of consent and 
standardization are incomplete.  Suppose you buy a cup of coffee.  You have 
not consented to the fine print on the coffee cup in any way that is worth 
mentioning.  You know roughly what is in the contract; it is, after all, 
standardized.  There is no need to read it.  Indeed, it would be an economic 
tragedy if you did read the fine print.  The time cost of doing so might well 
exceed the benefit to you of purchasing the coffee.  The cost of obtaining your 
consent could kill the deal. 
This Article contradicts the received wisdom of contract theory.  I focus on 
the cost of consent, rather than its presence or absence.  This redefines the 
question of consent.  The relevant question, I posit, is not whether the customer 
has purchased enough information to have meaningfully consented to the 
contract.  Rather, the important question is how much information is efficient 
for the consumer to purchase.  I also propose that standardization reduces, 
rather than increases, the information costs of consent.  As a result, I propose 
that courts should minimize the cost sum of contractual consent and surprise, 
just as they minimize the cost sum of precautions and accidents in torts.  
Finally, I propose that courts reconsider the use of information-forcing rules in 
the mass-market context. 
 
same contract to everyone.  The second refers to standardization across drafters.  For example, every widget 
manufacturer may come to offer the same or similar terms.  Both are important for consumers who seek to 
reduce information costs.  A consumer suffers lower information costs if the cup of Starbucks coffee she buys 
today is subject to the same terms and conditions as the cup of Starbucks coffee she bought yesterday.  This 
saves the consumer time because she does not have to relearn the terms of each deal.  But consumers also 
benefit if the standardized contract they receive from Starbucks is substantially the same as the deal they get 
from Daily Grind. 
 6 See Joseph M. Perillo, Neutral Standardizing of Contracts, 28 PACE L. REV. 179, 180–84 (2008) 
(discussing the literature of standardization outside of contract); see also Mark A. Hall, A Theory of Economic 
Informed Consent, 31 GA. L. REV. 511, 512 (1997) (discussing the “fundamental incompatibility of 
conventional informed consent theory and modern economic reality”); Schuck, supra note 1, at 903–05 
(discussing the costs of informed consent in healthcare); Avery Wiener Katz, Is Electronic Contracting 
Different? Contract Law in the Information Age 1 (2005) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.columbia.edu/ 
~ak472/papers/Electronic%20Contracting.pdf (arguing that standardization and search in electronic contexts 
can reduce information costs). 
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This leads to a counterintuitive payoff.  If standardized deals lower 
information costs, customized deals may raise them.  I argue that customized 
deals that economic theory has long considered efficient instead increase 
information costs for third parties and thus can be suboptimal across the run of 
mass-market contracts.  This may explain why firms will not negotiate with 
consumers for idiosyncratic but otherwise efficient contract terms.  (Imagine 
negotiating over the counter at Best Buy, even for terms for which you are 
willing to pay more than the cost to Best Buy.  Best Buy is unlikely to agree, 
even though the terms are efficient between the parties.7) 
A caveat: these insights apply best to mass-market, high-volume, low-value 
transactions, in which the slight increase in transaction costs engendered by 
information-forcing rules actually threatens a percentage of the potential 
transactions.  Nobody wants to dicker terms over a purchase of a cup of coffee; 
everyone wants to negotiate over terms in a home-purchase agreement.  In 
individuated, customized contracts, the parties themselves clearly believe that 
the cost in time and money of dickering terms is lower than the potential 
damage caused by deviation from one or both parties’ expectations.  Thus, I 
confine my discussion to the mass-market context. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the traditional literature 
of contractual consent, the economic literature of Coasean bargains and 
incomplete contracts, and the literature of information costs.  Part II illustrates 
the economic cost of requiring consumers to buy too much information.  It 
argues that contractual consent is a transaction cost to be minimized, not a 
good to be maximized.  Part III shows that even when information exchange is 
efficient for two contracting parties, their creation of an idiosyncratic 
agreement may increase information costs for third parties.  Part IV addresses 
and ultimately rejects concerns that contract standardization may stifle 
innovation in contract terms.  Part V closes with final observations and 
recommendations. 
I. LITERATURE 
Contract theory is an old field, and it is useful to examine what has gone 
before.  Liberal theory has enshrined consent at the center of the contract 
 
 7 Of course, the clerk at the counter lacks authority to make such a deal.  Issues of agency and apparent 
authority aside, the issue of authority merely begs the question as to why Best Buy would structure its 
practices that way, if it meant turning down mutually beneficial contract terms. 
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process and encourages courts to maximize consent by maximizing 
information exchange.8  Economic theory has largely ignored issues of 
consent, focusing instead on the Coasean bargain.9  To the limited extent that 
economists have focused on consent costs, they too have encouraged courts to 
maximize information exchange.10  This Article asserts that consent is costly 
and that information exchange should be minimized in certain cases. 
The first section below discusses liberal theories of contractual consent.  
The second section discusses economic views of consent and the development 
of information-forcing rules.  The third section discusses the literature of 
information costs, a literature that has not yet been applied to contract law.  
Throughout this Part, I identify the gaps that my analysis fills in the current 
literature, as well as points of departure between prior literature and the current 
analysis. 
A. Liberal Contract Theory 
Traditional theories of contract rely on informed consent as a linchpin of 
contract, whether as an expression of a contracting party’s individual 
autonomy or as a building block in a reciprocal relationship that is the 
foundation of the business relationship between two parties.11  Traditional 
theory asserts that without meaningful informed consent, there is no contract.12  
These theories express the liberal principle that a person may not be 
contractually bound except by her consent.13  As such, the basic approach of 
 
 8 See Schuck, supra note 1, at 900. 
 9 See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of 
Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1285 (1980) (“The parties can always bargain out from the rule, for instance by a 
limited damages agreement.  Thus, when transactions costs are zero, the particular damage rule selected for 
reciprocal promises is irrelevant.  Although the existence of transactions costs renders bargaining over damage 
rules costly in practice, the feedback adjustment of the return promise markedly reduces the potentially 
inefficient effects of legal rules.”); see also infra notes 25–42. 
 10 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97 (1989) (“Because the non-enforcement default potentially penalizes both 
parties, it encourages both of them to include a quantity term.”). 
 11 See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL 
RELATIONS 71 (1980) (setting out a theory of contract, termed “relational,” which describes contract as a 
subsection of the broader ongoing relationship of the parties); see also Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of 
Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 270 (1986) (“Properly understood, contract law is that part of a system of 
entitlements that identifies those circumstances in which entitlements are validly transferred from person to 
person by their consent.”). 
 12 See Barnett, supra note 11, at 270 (“Consent is the moral component that distinguishes valid from 
invalid transfers of alienable rights.”). 
 13 See Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and the Waning of Consent, in 
BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 189, 196 (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007) [hereinafter 
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liberal theories to contractual consent could be paraphrased as “the more the 
merrier.”14 
The modern discussion about consent in standardized contracts seeks to 
return to a traditional, robust sense of contractual consent.15  The focus of this 
debate is on ensuring that consumers have meaningfully consented to the terms 
of an agreement.16  Theorists discuss and decry the application of End User 
License Agreements, Terms of Use, and Terms of Service to consumers who 
have not knowledgeably consented to the terms of a contract in any way.17  For 
example, a consumer might be held to have consented to collection of private 
information about that customer merely by virtue of having browsed a 
website.18  The Terms of Use of the website, available if one were to search 
hard enough, bind the consumer to part with her personal data both at that 
website and wherever else she might travel on the web.  Similarly, clicking “I 
Accept” upon downloading software, entering a website, or turning on a 
 
Radin, Boilerplate Today] (“The traditional picture of contract is the time-honored meeting of the minds.  The 
traditional picture imagines two autonomous wills coming together to express their autonomy by binding 
themselves reciprocally to a bargain of exchange.”). 
 14 I use “liberal” here in the philosophical, not the political, sense.  Liberal contract theory holds that no 
person may be bound by law except by her informed consent, leading to the twin fictions of the social contract 
and of consent to mass-market contracts.  See Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 
575 (1933) (“According to the classical view, the law of contract gives expression to and protects the will of 
the parties, for the will is something inherently worthy of respect.”); see also Michael I. Krauss, Tort Law and 
Private Ordering, 35 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 623, 625 n.9 (1991) (“The ‘Autonomy of the Will’ theory, fundamental 
to the elaboration of classical liberal theories of contract, holds that humans are characterized by their 
sovereign capacity to self-determine their future through free choice.  Although all choice is influenced by 
people and by circumstances (uninfluenced action is the result of instinct, not choice), the Autonomy of the 
Will theory refuses to equate influence to duress.” (citing THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. XIV (M. 
Oakeshott ed., Basil Blackwell 1946) (1651))). 
 15 See Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J. 1125, 1153 
(2000) (“If the world of online contract turns out to be more standardized—or more obviously standardized—
than the world of offline contract, the world of online contract will be troubling from the point of view that 
holds consent requisite for binding obligation to arise.”). 
 16 See id. at 1160 (“Although customization is technologically possible on the Web as never before, 
nevertheless machine-made contract and the global scope of electronic commerce may result in more 
standardization and even less room for old-fashioned bargaining.  What will happen to the liberal ideal of 
requiring consent before parting with one’s entitlements?”). 
 17 See Margaret Jane Radin, Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and Machine, 70 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1135 (2002) (“Almost every website contains a little link at the bottom of the home 
page labeled ‘terms’ or something similar.  If you click on these terms, you will most often see a full-blown 
purported adhesion contract containing much fine print, in which the user exculpates the firm for its own 
negligence, agrees to binding arbitration or litigation on its home turf under its home jurisdiction’s law, agrees 
to limit damages to the price of the product, waives all warranties express and implied, and so on.”). 
 18 See Radin, Boilerplate Today, supra note 13, at 196 (“Consent is fictional on Web sites whose terms of 
service state that just by browsing the site . . . one has agreed to whatever the terms say, now or as they may be 
changed in the future.”). 
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computer is deemed sufficient consent to enforce broad-reaching contracts.19  
Contract theorists see these cases as a deviation from norms of contract law 
rather than as its desirable next step.20 
The theory advanced in this Article departs sharply from the traditional 
approach to contractual consent.  Instead of advocating information-forcing 
rules to make sure that consumers are informed, this Article seeks to 
demonstrate that informed consent is expensive, that standardization is the best 
way to keep information costs low, and that consumers rationally prefer 
standardized deals to idiosyncratic ones. 
For high-volume, low-value transactions, each trade generates very little 
social wealth.  Let us return to the example of purchasing a cup of coffee.  
Perhaps that exchange creates twenty-five cents worth of social wealth.  Now, 
imagine the time cost involved in reading even a short contract.  Even if we set 
opportunity costs equally low by assuming the consumer is paid the federal 
minimum wage (which works out to nearly ten cents per minute), the value of 
the transaction will vanish if contract doctrine compels the consumer to spend 
three minutes perusing fine print.  In this case, it would cost more to become 
informed as to the terms of the agreement than the amount of wealth generated 
by the trade itself.  Thus, there is an affirmative value in not reading a 
contract.21  Standardization is the best way to constrain the range of consumer 
choice and reduce information costs.  This Article therefore departs from the 
received wisdom on both the advisability of information-forcing rules in the 
mass-market context and the rules that disfavor consumer contract 
standardization. 
 
 19 See id. (“Consent is fictional when almost all of us click onscreen boxes affirming that we have read 
and understood things we have not read and would not understand if we did.”). 
 20 See Radin, supra note 15, at 1161 (“[T]he only ameliorative avenue I can see is for policymakers to 
take on the task of deciding which terms it is important to draw buyers’ attention to in order to preserve their 
autonomy, and which kinds of terms must be simply excluded on autonomy grounds.”). 
 21 Although he did so in a critique of the economic approach to law, Ian Macneil succinctly stated the 
problem: 
[T]he limited extent to which it is possible for people to consent to all the terms of a transaction, 
even a relatively simple and very discrete one, soon forces the development of legal fictions 
expanding the scope of “consent” far beyond anything remotely close to what the parties ever had 
in mind. 
Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and 
Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 883–84 (1978). 
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B. Boilerplate and Coasean Bargains 
The economic analysis of boilerplate discusses the benefits of contract 
standardization for contract drafters.  It argues quite effectively that network 
effects cause contract drafters to reuse contract language (in the form of 
boilerplate) to save themselves drafting costs, economize on learning costs, 
reuse “safe” language that has been vetted by courts, and signal to prospective 
counterparties that the contract drafter does not seek an unfair advantage 
through the drafting process.22 
This boilerplate literature focuses primarily on why a drafter would reuse 
contract language.23  The literature leaves for future development, however, the 
question of why a mass-market consumer would prefer a standard deal to an 
individuated one.  The usual account—that standardization creates drafting-
cost savings that drafters will then pass on to the consumer—seems 
incongruous with contracting experience.  Drafters pass cost savings along 
only in competitive markets.  Unless there is a reason not to do so, companies 
will quite rationally pocket the savings.  Yet even in fields where competition 
is suppressed (for example, in car component manufacturing in which there are 
few buyers and high barriers to entry), with correspondingly low incentives to 
pass drafting-cost savings on to buyers, buyers still prefer standard deals.24 
Economic literature has not explained why consumers regularly prefer a 
standardized agreement to an individuated one, even when the standard 
agreement is more expensive.  Where economic theory falls short, common 
sense does not.  Imagine choosing between a high-priced, brand-name 
computer and a lower cost, customized computer.  Many of us would select the 
high-priced standardized deal.  This Article therefore seeks to fill this gap 
between theory and practice by focusing on the direct informational benefits of 
contract standardization to the consumer. 
 
 22 See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 3, at 718 (“One set of benefits, which we call ‘learning benefits,’ 
arises when a firm adopts a contract term that has been commonly used in the past, regardless of whether other 
firms will continue using it in the future.  A second set of benefits, which we call ‘network benefits,’ arises 
when a firm adopts a term that will be part of the firm’s contract at the same time that it is part of many other 
firms’ contracts, regardless of whether it has been commonly used in the past.”). 
 23 Id. at 719–20 (“Potential ‘learning benefits’ of both commonly used explicit terms and default terms 
include: (a) drafting efficiency; (b) reduced uncertainty over the meaning and validity of a term due to prior 
judicial rulings; and (c) familiarity with a term among lawyers, other professionals, and the investment 
community.”). 
 24 Id. 
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Economic analyses to date have not focused on the costs of contractual 
consent.25  In Coasean bargaining, parties attempt to bargain around 
contractual default rules.26  The purpose of Coasean contract experiments is to 
show that it does not matter who benefits from an initial allocation of a right.27  
If Party A is initially given a resource, Party B may pay A for the right to use it 
if B can put it to a better use.28  Regardless of who initially has a right, other 
parties may bribe the initial owner if they have more efficient uses for the 
owned resource.  Coasean experiments in contract bargains seek to show that 
initial allocations of rights do not matter if the parties are able to contract 
around those allocations in a cost-free manner. 
The Coase Theorem recognizes that transaction costs may cause an 
otherwise efficient bargain to fail.29  The cost of reaching a bargain might be 
enough that an otherwise mutually beneficial trade will not take place.  So the 
Theorem assumes that parties will reach efficient outcomes regardless of legal 
rules only when transaction costs are zero.30  To mimic this, Coasean 
experiments minimize transaction costs.31  The cost of informing a contractual 
counterparty of the terms, in order to secure her consent, is a transaction cost.  
One assumption of Coasean contract literature is, therefore, that the cost of 
securing the other party’s consent to modify the contractual default is zero.32  
 
 25 Id. at 715–16 (“[W]e present a theoretical, institutional, and empirical analysis of two independent, but 
conceptually related, forces that influence the balance of standardization, customization, and innovation in 
contracts: learning externalities and network externalities.”). 
 26 See Stewart Schwab, A Coasean Experiment on Contract Presumptions, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 237, 242 
(1988) (“[T]he Coase Theorem asserts that a change in contract presumption affects neither the efficiency of 
contracts nor the distribution of wealth between the parties.”). 
 27 Id. (“Probably the most common formulation of the Coase Theorem asserts that, absent transaction 
costs, interacting parties will reach an efficient outcome even if the law awards initial legal entitlements to less 
valued uses.”). 
 28 Id. at 238 (“The Coase Theorem predicts that, absent transaction costs, the entitlement holder will use 
the entitlement only if he is the efficient user.  If not, the Coase Theorem predicts, he will make himself better 
off by trading the entitlement (for a price) to someone who values it more highly.”). 
 29 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960) (“These operations are often 
extremely costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many transactions that would be carried out in a 
world in which the pricing system worked without cost.”). 
 30 See id. (“The argument has proceeded up to this point on the assumption . . . that there were no costs 
involved in carrying out market transactions.”). 
 31 See id. at 16 (“It is clear that an alternative form of economic organization which could achieve the 
same result at less cost than would be incurred by using the market would enable the value of production to be 
raised.”). 
 32 See Donald H. Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J.L. & ECON. 427, 427 (1972) (“The 
proposition is: That in a world of perfect competition, perfect information, and zero transaction costs, the 
allocation of resources in the economy will be efficient . . . .”). 
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The Coasean experiments to date have treated contractual consent as costless 
to obtain.33 
For example, suppose participants play a game in which they assume the 
roles of Employer and Employee.34  In the game, Employer and Employee 
attempt to bargain over a clause determining the conditions under which 
Employee can be fired.35  In one theoretical state, the law allocates the 
employment right to Employee, in the form of a “for-cause” termination rule.  
In the other theoretical state, the law allocates the employment right to 
Employer, under an “at-will” employment rule.  The question that the Coasean 
experimenter seeks to answer is whether the parties will bargain around the 
default rule (that is, bargain for “for-cause” termination in an “at-will” state, or 
for “at-will” employment in a “for-cause” state) if it is efficient to do so. 
If consent is otherwise costless to obtain, the parties will reach an efficient 
contract whether the state law presumption favors at-will employment or for-
cause termination.36  If consent is costly to obtain, inefficient outcomes will 
occur.  Because the focus of the experiment is whether the parties will bargain 
around defaults, the structure of the game makes consent functionally costless.  
There is a sunk cost effect.  By the time the experiment begins, the participants 
have already incurred the cost of bargaining.  For example, students at 
Stanford took part in the experiment above as part of class participation.37  
Students had to attend the class anyway and had to spend time bargaining 
regardless of the outcome.  Their time was already wasted.  These costs were 
sunk costs and did not deter them from bargaining.38  In fact, beyond initial 
sessions, experiment participants were often penalized for not reaching an 
 
 33 See supra note 30. 
 34 See Schwab, supra note 26, at 240 (“A nonunionized, competitive labor market nicely illustrates a 
contract presumption’s theoretical inability to influence the distribution of wealth.”). 
 35 See id. at 246 (discussing experimental design). 
 36 See id. at 254 (“In sum, the data are consistent with the reformulated Coasean hypothesis that the legal 
rule does not affect whether the parties reach an efficient result.”). 
 37 See id. at 246 (“As part of my regular law school labor law classes and David Lipsky’s industrial and 
labor relations (ILR) classes on collective bargaining theory, 222 students were paired and asked to bargain 
over a collective bargaining contract. . . .  Students were given a regularly scheduled class period for their 
initial bargaining session, and about half the students completed negotiations and signed their contract in this 
period.”). 
 38 See RICHARD A. POSNER, The Nature of Economic Reasoning, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 7–8 
(4th ed. 1992) (“‘Sunk’ (incurred) costs do not affect decisions on price and quantity . . . .  This discussion of 
sunk costs should help explain the emphasis that economists place on the ex ante (before the fact) rather than 
ex post (after the fact) perspective.  Rational people base their decisions on their expectations of the future 
rather than on their regrets about the past.  They treat bygones as bygones.”). 
FAIRFIELD GALLEYFINAL 6/2/2009  12:28:13 PM 
1412 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58 
agreement.39  Thus, the “null alternative”—in which the costs of bargaining 
were greater than the gains of bargaining—was off the table.  The very form of 
the Coasean experiment selects against those whose time is more valuable than 
the per-hour opportunity cost of the experiment. 
Study participants in experiments are therefore willing to spend time 
dickering terms that many of us would not be willing to spend.  From the 
Coasean bargain perspective, this is good.  The participants will act as though 
contracting were costless.  This is a simple way of simulating the zero-
transaction-cost assumption of the Coase Theorem.  But for the purposes of 
this Article, those experiments avoid the most important part of contracting: 
the costs of reaching a deal. 
For “real world” contracting parties, the time spent reading or dickering 
contract terms is a marginal cost, not a sunk cost.40  Real world contracting 
parties are not being paid to dicker terms to contract agreements.  Nor have 
they already suffered the cost of time such that they might as well read the 
contract.  If I do not read the contract, I save time.  Or conversely, if I must 
spend a lot of time learning the fine details of an agreement, I may decide not 
to make the deal at all.  That is precisely the point of departure between this 
Article and its predecessors.  This Article treats consent as costly to obtain and 
asks whether a consumer will enter a transaction at all, given the information 
costs of doing so.41 
 
 39 See Schwab, supra note 26, at 247 (“[E]ach side would lose ten points for every hour the contract 
signing was delayed . . . .”). 
 40 See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 700 (1975) (“Marginal cost is the increment to total cost that results 
from producing an additional increment of output.  It is a function solely of variable costs, because fixed costs, 
by definition, are costs unaffected by changes in output.”). 
 41 Notably, a pre-Coasean contract theorist, Karl Llewellyn, came closest to articulating a cost theory of 
consent.  See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370–71 (1960).  His 
approach was to differentiate between specific consent to dickered terms, and “blanket assent” to reasonable 
additional terms.  Llewellyn’s approach generates many of the same benefits of the cost theory set forth in this 
Article—notably, the common-sense intuition that consumers do not (and probably should not) read mass-
market contracts.  This Article recognizes an intellectual debt to Llewellyn’s formulation.  However, there are 
serious differences in the approaches.  First, Llewellyn did not provide any theory of consent as a cost.  Rather, 
he merely recognized that informed consent to all of the terms of a mass-market contract was an implausible 
standard and that courts ought not to use that standard to determine whether a consumer consented.  More 
importantly, Llewellyn did not compare the cost of any given consent (whether “dickered” or “blanket”) with 
the damage from any surprise caused by deviation from the consumer’s expectations.  The approach suggested 
by this Article does not differentiate between “dickered” or “default” terms but uses a single, unitary standard: 
where the cost of informed consent to a given term exceeds the damage caused by surprise (weighted of course 
by the chance of the surprise actually occurring), courts ought to let sleeping dogs lie, rather than “fix” the 
contract by using information-forcing doctrines. 
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I do not mean to suggest that the Coasean literature is unaware of the 
importance of transaction costs.42  To the contrary, influential economic 
literature focuses on how legal rules might encourage parties to minimize 
transaction costs by exchanging closely held information.43  This literature 
advocates the use of information-forcing rules to encourage contracting parties 
to reveal information that only one party knows.44  These theorists argue that 
information-forcing rules bring the deal closer to the Coasean ideal of perfect 
information.45  Under this view, encouraging parties to reveal secret 
information has a positive secondary effect on the cost of contractual consent 
because the party with the lower cost in obtaining the information is 
encouraged to reveal it, thus lowering the costs of informed consent.46 
A primary example is the academic discussion about incomplete 
contracts.47  Incomplete-contract theory discusses the role of default rules and 
mandatory rules in encouraging efficient contracting behavior.48  The literature 
focuses on what to do when parties do not address an issue in a contract, 
leaving the decision to default contract law.49  The question then becomes 
whether courts should reduce costs by picking default rules that the parties 
would have chosen had they negotiated or whether courts should adopt a 
suboptimal default rule, termed a “penalty default,” to encourage the parties to 
bargain around the default.50  Such a penalty default rule encourages (or 
 
 42 Indeed, the absence of transaction costs is central to the Coasean approach.  See Schwab, supra note 
26, at 238 (“The Coase Theorem predicts that, absent transaction costs, the entitlement holder will use the 
entitlement only if he is the efficient user.”). 
 43 See generally Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10. 
 44 Id. at 103–04 (“When relatively informed parties strategically withhold information, courts, to promote 
information revelation, should choose a default that the informed party does not want.”). 
 45 Id. at 103 (“But the high-damage millers may intentionally choose to withhold information that would 
make their contracts more efficient. . . .  To counteract this strategic behavior, courts should choose defaults 
that are different from what the parties would have wanted.”). 
 46 Id. at 99 (arguing that “social welfare may be enhanced by forcing parties to reveal information to a 
subsidized judicial system”). 
 47 See generally id. at 87 (arguing for contract default rules that penalize parties who conceal private 
information); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 
100 YALE L.J. 615, 616 (1990) (describing strategic incentives to profit from closely held information). 
 48 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10, at 87 (“The legal rules of contracts and corporations can be 
divided into two distinct classes.  The larger class consists of ‘default’ rules that parties can contract around by 
prior agreement, while the smaller, but important, class consists of ‘immutable’ rules that parties cannot 
change by contractual agreement.”). 
 49 See id. at 91 (“This Article provides a theory of how courts and legislatures should set default rules.  
We suggest that efficient defaults would take a variety of forms that at times would diverge from the ‘what the 
parties would have contracted for’ principle.”). 
 50 See id. at 93 (“This Article provides a general theory of when efficiency-minded courts or legislatures 
should set penalty defaults and how they should choose between tailored and untailored default rules.”). 
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forces) parties to disclose closely held information in order to bargain on an 
issue.51 
This Article departs from the incomplete-contract literature at two points.  
Penalty default rules and other information-forcing rules maximize information 
exchange.  This Article argues that information exchange is costly and that the 
cost sum of information exchange and surprise should be minimized.  
Information-exchange theorists tend to suggest permissive information-forcing 
rules that cause parties to exchange information only when it is efficient to do 
so.52  But, as discussed below, the penalty default approach ignores 
information costs by encouraging consumers to attempt to create idiosyncratic, 
customized deals.53  For example, if you absolutely must have a Beanie Baby 
by Christmas, information-forcing rules encourage you to tell the shipper this 
so that the shipper may charge you a higher premium.54 This higher premium 
covers the shipper’s liability in the event that the Beanie Baby does not arrive 
until after the holiday season and your nephew is bitterly disappointed.55  Yet 
such negotiation does not occur in the mass-market context, even when it is 
efficient on a deal-by-deal basis.  This Article explains why this is so.  Such 
deals may be efficient for the drafter and consumer but may raise information 
costs for all other users of standardized contracts.56 
Under the influence of incomplete-contract theory, courts have adopted 
rules requiring greater and greater disclosure from drafters.57  The irony is that 
the greater the amount of disclosure, the more rational it is for consumers not 
to read any of it.  Learning about the contract terms simply takes too much 
 
 51 See id. at 92 (“Penalty defaults are designed to give at least one party to the contract an incentive to 
contract around the default rule and therefore to choose affirmatively the contract provision they prefer.  In 
contrast to the received wisdom, penalty defaults are purposefully set at what the parties would not want—in 
order to encourage the parties to reveal information to each other or to third parties (especially the courts).”). 
 52 See id. at 97 (“Penalty defaults, by definition, give at least one party to the contract an incentive to 
contract around the default.  From an efficiency perspective, penalty default rules can be justified as a way to 
encourage the production of information.”). 
 53 See id. (“Because the non-enforcement default potentially penalizes both parties, it encourages both of 
them to include a quantity term.”). 
 54 See id. at 102 (“Nonetheless, so long as transaction costs are not prohibitive, a miller with high 
consequential damages will gain from revealing this information and contracting for greater insurance from the 
carrier because the carrier is the least-cost avoider.”). 
 55 See id. at 101–02 (“Informing the carrier creates value because if the carrier foresees the loss, he will 
be able to prevent it more efficiently.  At the same time, however, revealing the information to the carrier will 
undoubtedly increase the price of shipping.”). 
 56 See infra Part III.A. 
 57 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10, at 97 (“Because the non-enforcement default potentially penalizes 
both parties, it encourages both of them to include a quantity term.”). 
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time compared to the benefit received.  Information-cost theory therefore may 
do a better job than incomplete-contract theory of explaining and predicting 
consumer contracting behavior. 
C. Information Costs in Property 
This Article applies information-cost theory to understand standardization 
in contract law.  Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith first applied a model of 
information costs to analyze standardization in property law.58  It is therefore 
useful to briefly describe how information-cost models have been used in the 
property context and to discuss why information-cost theory has not yet been 
applied to the contract context.  In this section, I discuss the history of 
information-cost theory, its application to property law, why it has not yet been 
applied to contract law, and why I think it ought to be so applied. 
Property is a system of mandatory rules, not modifiable by the agreement 
of the parties.59  The goal of property law is to keep transaction costs low.60  If 
transaction costs are low, high-value resources will flow to high-value users.61  
Property law keeps transaction costs low by limiting the number of forms that 
property can take.62  Information-cost theory therefore asserts that there is a 
reason to keep the number of property forms low.  This is the numerus clausus 
principle—Latin for “the number [of forms] is closed.”63  New forms of 
property can only be created by the slow grinding of the machinery of the 
common law (or legislatures) and not by private agreement.64 
 
 58 See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: 
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus]; 
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001). 
 59 Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 58, at 1. 
 60 Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 2, at 68 (“The goal of reducing or eliminating transaction costs has 
strongly influenced both scholarship and public policy.”). 
 61 See Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules—A Comment, 11 J.L. 
& ECON. 67, 68 (1968) (“If people are rational, bargains are costless, and there are no legal impediments to 
bargains, transactions will ex hypothesis occur to the point where bargains can no longer improve the situation; 
to the point, in short, of optimal resource allocation.”). 
 62 See Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 58, at 8 (“The existence of unusual property rights 
increases the cost of processing information about all property rights. . . .  Standardization of property rights 
reduces these . . . costs.”). 
 63 Id. at 4. 
 64 See id. at 69 (“By insisting that courts respect the status quo in terms of the menu of property rights, 
the numerus clausus also channels legal change in property rights to the legislature.  This institutional-choice 
dimension, we have argued, reinforces the information-cost minimization features of the doctrine, because 
legislated changes communicate information about the legal dimensions of property more effectively than 
judicially mandated changes.”). 
FAIRFIELD GALLEYFINAL 6/2/2009  12:28:13 PM 
1416 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58 
Consider the fee simple absolute, the leasehold estate, or the other limited 
forms property can take.  These limitations on forms lower information costs 
by constraining choice.  When there are only a few forms of property to choose 
from, it becomes cheaper to choose.65 
This phenomenon is part of everyday life.  For example, the process of 
ordering at a restaurant is greatly facilitated if there is only one entrée on the 
menu.66  (Of course, there is a tradeoff: frustration costs rise if some customers 
do not want the chicken pot pie.)  The standardization of the menu reduces 
information costs.  After going to the restaurant once, one does not even need a 
menu to order. 
Standardization in property forms reduces information costs not only for a 
given person entering into a transaction, but for all third parties considering 
such a transaction.67  On the other hand, idiosyncratic arrangements in property 
would, if enforced by courts, raise information costs. Suppose that Party A 
wants to use Party B’s bicycle on Monday mornings.  A and B decide to create 
a new property right—a “Monday-morning use right”—which B will sell to 
A.68  This is an efficient deal for both B and A.  B wants the money more than 
the bicycle on Monday mornings, and A wants a bicycle on Monday mornings 
without having to store it on her back porch.69 
How could such a deal be inefficient?  Consider the problem such an 
arrangement poses for third parties.  If the law countenances Monday-morning 
use rights, then anyone who wants to buy the bicycle from B will have to 
inquire whether the bicycle is encumbered with such a right.70  The problem 
gets even worse.  Anyone else who wishes to buy a bicycle will suffer 
information costs, in the form of the question: “Is the bicycle that I want to buy 
 
 65 See id. at 33 (“When it comes to the basic legal dimensions of property, limiting the number of forms 
thus makes the determination of their nature less costly.”). 
 66 Id. 
 67 See id. (“Limiting the number of basic property forms allows a market participant or a potential 
violator to limit his or her inquiry to whether the interest does or does not have the features of the forms on the 
menu.  Fancies not on the closed list need not be considered because they will not be enforced.”). 
 68 See id. at 27 (“But suppose A wants to create a ‘time-share’ in the watch, which would allow B to use 
the watch on Mondays but only on Mondays (with A retaining for now the rights to the watch on all other 
days).”). 
 69 See id. (“As a matter of contract law, A and B are perfectly free to enter into such an idiosyncratic 
agreement.  But A and B are not permitted by the law of personal property to create a property right in the use 
of the watch on Mondays only and to transfer this property right from A to B.”). 
 70 See id. (“But consider what will happen now when any of the other ninety-nine watch owners try to 
sell their watches.  Given the awareness that someone has created a Monday-only right, anyone else buying a 
watch must now also investigate whether any particular watch does not include Monday rights.”). 
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burdened with an idiosyncratic Monday-morning use right?”71  If courts allow 
any form of customized property (perhaps by adding Tuesday-evening use 
rights to the mix), the value of having standardized property forms rapidly 
decreases.72 
The cost of the idiosyncratic deal is not borne by the original parties to the 
deal, both of whom know that the bike is subject to a Monday-morning use 
right.  The cost is borne by every third party that enters the market for a 
bicycle.  The increased information cost is a straightforward externality.  But if 
property law limits property forms—to the fee simple, for example—then 
third-party prospective purchasers know what sticks in the bundle come along 
with a purchase without needing to conduct an expensive inquiry.73 
Until now, contract law has been excluded from information-cost analysis.  
Contract law has traditionally been seen as the antithesis of property.74  The 
flexibility of the contractual form often results in high information costs and 
low frustration costs.75  The low frustration costs occur because customized 
contracts can be used to craft any deal that the parties desire.76  The high 
information costs happen because a high level of customization does not 
permit parties to any given individualized contract to know anything about the 
terms of any other contract.  Information-cost theorists have thus far defined 
contract law through individuated, customized, negotiated agreements, rather 
than standardized deals.77  Consider employment contracts.  My employer and 
I can negotiate for any salary we agree upon.  Thus, our frustration costs are 
 
 71 See id. at 32 (“Those considering whether to purchase property rights in [given objects] will have more 
to investigate: They will have to assure themselves that they are getting all the days of the week that they want.  
Furthermore, they will have to worry about dimensions of division and elaboration that perhaps no one has yet 
thought of, making the acquisition of any [object] more uncertain as well as riskier.”). 
 72 See id. at 26–27 (“The need for standardization in property law stems from an externality involving 
measurement costs: Parties who create new property rights will not take into account the full magnitude of the 
measurement costs they impose on strangers to the title.”). 
 73 See id.  Suppose that property forms were not standardized.  Title searches would take more time and 
become more expensive because every prior idiosyncrasy must be excluded by the searching party. 
 74 See id. at 3 (“[P]arties to a contract are free to be as whimsical or fanciful as they like . . . .  [T]he law 
will enforce as property only those interests that conform to a limited number of standard forms.”). 
 75 See id. at 55 (“[C]ontract rights themselves can be tailored just as a house can be custom-built, but the 
way of owning it is highly simplified to reduce information costs to third parties.”). 
 76 See id. 
 77 See id. at 3 (“A central difference between contract and property concerns the freedom to ‘customize’ 
legally enforceable interests.  The law of contract recognizes no inherent limitations on the nature or the 
duration of the interests that can be the subject of a legally binding contract . . . .  Generally speaking, the law 
will enforce as property only those interests that conform to a limited number of standard forms.”). 
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low.  But I cannot determine the salaries of my colleagues based on my own 
salary term.  Thus, my information costs are high. 
By contrast, the hallmark of property systems is high standardization, 
resulting in low information costs and high frustration costs.78  The cost of a 
highly standardized property system is that parties will not be able to achieve 
the deals they want, resulting in frustration.79  For example, until state 
legislatures adopted the condominium form of property, courts refused to 
accept that innovation.80  This frustrated buyers and sellers. 
The rationale usually offered for strongly separating contract from property 
law is that property law binds the world.81  Contract law does not, due to the 
constraints of privity.82  Idiosyncratic forms of property raise information costs 
for transactions in property because property law binds third parties.83  A 
putative Monday-morning use right complicates transactions for everyone 
because everyone is bound by property rules.84  If a purchaser buys a bicycle 
that was previously encumbered by a Monday-morning right, she is bound by 
that right. 
Property theorists note that property rights are in rem—actionable against 
the object owned—rather than in personam—against another person.85  
Because property rights are in rem, they bind successors in interest.86  
Customized property rights therefore create a potential minefield for 
subsequent purchasers.87  Property theorists distinguish between contract and 
 
 78 See id. at 38–42 (discussing the interaction between frustration costs and property rights). 
 79 See id. (discussing the economically optimal standardization of property forms as a function of 
frustration costs and information costs). 
 80 See id. at 15–16 (“In theory, it might be possible to create a condominium by clever combination of 
preexisting property forms.  But in practice, condominiums did not emerge until the 1960s, when virtually all 
states adopted statutes expressly authorizing the creation of condominiums.  Thus, the story of the emergence 
of the condominium is also broadly consistent with the numerus clausus in that this new form of property was 
the product of legislative change, rather than private contract or judicial innovation.”). 
 81 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus 
Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 374 (2002) (“Property rights differ 
from contract rights by being ‘good against all the world.’”). 
 82 Id. 
 83 See Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 58, at 32 (“[B]ecause property rights are in rem, all 
those who might violate property rights, accidentally or not, must know what they are supposed to respect.  An 
indefinite set of types of rights will raise the cost of preventing violations through investigation of rights.”). 
 84 See id. 
 85 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 81, at 409 (“Under their view, the distinguishing feature of a 
property right is that it is an in rem right . . . .”). 
 86 See id. at 409–10. 
 87 Id. 
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property on this ground.88  Once a right has been separated out from the 
property bundle of sticks, how are subsequent parties to know?89  The fact that 
property rights run against successors in interest divides property law from 
contract law in current theory.90 
Unlike property rights, contracts are limited by privity.91  Under the 
traditional approach, it would be fine for A and B to contract for B to use A’s 
bicycle on Monday mornings, because contract rights run only between A and 
B.  The contract right will not be enforceable against any subsequent purchaser 
of the bicycle.92  The bicycle will be free to pass unencumbered in the stream 
of commerce regardless of the contractual agreement between A and B. 
But what if one wanted to draft contracts that lowered information costs at 
the expense of some frustration?  This is not hard to imagine.  Such contracts 
would be one-size-fits-all.  They would constrain choice and would disfavor 
individualized negotiation in favor of a single contract form.  Of course, such 
contracts exist as our everyday standardized mass-market contracts. 
This Article departs from the literature by arguing that standardized 
contracts are like property in that the value of standardized contracts is that 
they lower information costs.  Standardization creates benefits and customized 
contract terms create costs for third parties to contracts, regardless of privity.  
The idiosyncratic terms in one contract can raise information costs for all other 
contracting parties. 
An example may help demonstrate how this happens.  The standard term in 
a sales contract is that merchants do not disclaim damages for personal 
injury.93  Now suppose two parties create an idiosyncratic waiver of personal 
 
 88 Id. at 378 (“[T]he attribute that distinguishes a property right from a contract right is that a property 
right is enforceable, not just against the original grantor of the right, but also against other persons to 
whom . . . rights in the asset . . . are . . . transferred.”). 
 89 Id. at 398 (“Accommodating verification rules comes at a price.  Permitting two or more strangers to 
establish and maintain, with ease, complicated and highly individualized relationships concerning use of a 
common asset is costly.”). 
 90 Id. at 379. 
 91 Id. 
 92 See Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 58, at 27 (“But suppose A wants to create a ‘time-
share’ in the watch, which would allow B to use the watch on Mondays but only on Mondays (with A retaining 
for now the rights to the watch on all other days).  As a matter of contract law, A and B are perfectly free to 
enter into such an idiosyncratic agreement.”). 
 93 See U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (2002) (“Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the 
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable.  Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the 
case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable . . . .”). 
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harm resulting from a negligently constructed microwave.  Assume the courts 
enforce this waiver.  If such an idiosyncratic waiver were permitted, all 
subsequent transacting parties who wanted the “standard” deal would suffer 
increased costs because they would have to ensure that the idiosyncratic term 
was not part of their proposed agreement.  This effect jumps the privity 
barrier.94  It does not depend on the original agreement binding anyone else.  
Rather, information costs for everyone who wants a microwave will rise if the 
idiosyncratic contract term appears in any agreement. 
Property theory fails to convincingly exclude contract law from 
information-cost analysis.  Standardized contracts reduce information costs just 
like standardized property forms do.95  Likewise, idiosyncratic contracts raise 
information costs just like idiosyncratic property forms do.96  This does not 
depend on whether the rights created by the contract “run with” the product or 
not. 
Suppose that you purchase a bicycle.  If you wanted a bicycle that was 
unencumbered by Monday-morning use rights, you would incur search costs to 
determine whether the bicycle you were about to purchase was subject to any 
such rights.  But that problem can be caused by either an idiosyncratic property 
right or by an idiosyncratic contract right.  The problem is that customized 
deals raise information costs for all parties who desire to rely on a standardized 
transaction.  If all bicycle sales contracts have standardized terms, then you can 
buy a bicycle without studying the contract.  But if courts begin to enforce 
idiosyncratic and customized terms, you must incur search costs to ensure that 
you get what you want. 
Rather than exclude contract law from information-cost analysis, I propose 
that information costs lie at the center of the distinction between dickered and 
standardized contracts.  The work of applying information-cost theory to 
contract has only barely begun.  I am aware of only two articles that apply a 
“property model” of information costs to contract law.97  In a prior article, I 
 
 94 It is worth noting that the “hard property” account relies on a strong view of privity of contract not 
supported in the contract literature of the latter half of the twentieth century.  The property account only works 
if privity prevents the costs of idiosyncratic agreements from spilling over in contracts cases, while the in rem 
effect of property causes spillover in property cases.  I do not think the strong version of privity assumed by 
the property theorists still exists.  See, e.g., Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931) (Cardozo, 
J.) (“[T]he assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace.”). 
 95 See infra Part III. 
 96 See infra Part III. 
 97 See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The Search Interest in Contract, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1237 (2007); Henry E. 
Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1175 (2006). 
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called for the use of a property model of contract to understand why consumers 
search for the deals they want, rather than negotiating for them.98  In another 
article, Henry Smith provided a property-based account of standardized 
contract terms.99  Smith viewed boilerplate as a middle ground between the 
“corner solutions” of property and contract—property being the bailiwick of 
strong standardization, and contract the bailiwick of strong customization.100  
Smith then discussed how contract boilerplate can use “modularity,” or the 
intentional limitation of interaction between different terms in a contract, to 
increase information flow and decrease transaction costs.101  This is indeed an 
important insight: I have elsewhere written that modularity is an important 
method of lowering the costs of searching for the right contractual deal, as part 
of a process of search optimization.102 
I share with Smith the intuition that property information-cost theory can 
be profitably extended to contract analysis.  But there the two analyses diverge.  
This Article treats information costs as central to contract theory, rather than as 
a middle ground between property and contract.  Unlike Smith, I do not place 
contract at one pole, and property at the other pole.103  Rather, both contract 
and property law reduce information costs at the expense of some frustration 
when they are standardized; and benefit from flexibility at the expense of 
higher information costs when they are individualized.104 
In sum, this Article fills several longstanding gaps in the literature.  Both 
traditional and economic contract theory encourage courts to maximize consent 
through use of information-forcing rules.  I challenge this presumption below 
by showing that consent is costly, and encourage courts to minimize the cost 
sum of contractual consent and consumer surprise.105  Moreover, traditional 
contract literature has generally mulcted standardized contracts for raising 
information costs.  I argue instead that standardization reduces information 
 
 98 Fairfield, supra note 97, at 1290. 
 99 Smith, supra note 97, at 1179. 
 100 See id. at 1176 (arguing that boilerplate language in contracts is in the middle of the spectrum running 
from contract rights to property rights). 
 101 See id. at 1176–77 (explaining how boilerplate takes advantage of modularity and the resulting 
benefits). 
 102 See Fairfield, supra note 97, at 1278–81 (describing search optimization and how it makes searching 
faster). 
 103 See Smith, supra note 97, at 1222 (“And boilerplate is interesting and revealing because it is perched 
somewhere between the poles of contract and property.”). 
 104 See infra Part III. 
 105 See infra Part III. 
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costs.106  Finally, where information-cost theorists have limited the application 
of information-cost theory to property law, I argue that information-cost theory 
is central to contract law, and indeed that standardized contracts cannot be 
understood without analyzing information costs. 
II. THE COST OF CONSENT 
This Part discusses the economic effect of forcing consumers to buy too 
much information.  Courts often view their role in contract cases as that of 
maximizing information exchange.107  I suggest here that courts instead ought 
to minimize the cost sum of information and surprise.  In tort law, economic 
theory has long advocated minimizing the sum of precautions and accidents.108  
I draw from tort theory to argue that courts should similarly minimize the cost 
sum of disclosures and surprise in contracts.  First, I show the cost of 
disclosures.  Second, I propose to reduce that cost by minimizing the cost sum 
of disclosures and surprise.  The subsequent sections discuss how courts can 
achieve this minimization by encouraging standardization in mass-market 
contracts. 
 
 106 See infra Part III. 
 107 See Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344, 363 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“[T]he contract 
readily comported with the ‘unfair surprise element’ of procedural unconscionability, i.e., supposedly agreed-
upon terms that are hidden in a prolix printed form and never brought to the attention of the weaker party.”); 
Parish v. Jumpking, Inc., 719 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Iowa 2006) (“Under the Restatement, a product ‘is defective 
because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could 
have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings . . . .’” (citing 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c) (1998))); C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. 
Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Iowa 1975) (demonstrating that a term is likely unconscionable “if the 
adhering party never had an opportunity to read the term, or if it is illegible or otherwise hidden from view” 
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 cmt. f (Tentative Draft Nos. 1–7, 1973))); Germantown 
Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (“An unexpected clause often appears in the 
boilerplate of a printed form and, if read at all, is often not understood.  By signing such a form, a party is 
bound only to those terms which such party would reasonably expect such a printed form to contain.”); Hadley 
v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (Exch. Div.) (“Now, if the special circumstances under which the 
contract was actually made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus known to both 
parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such a contract, which they would reasonably contemplate, 
would be the amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under these special 
circumstances so known and communicated.”); see also Schmitz, supra note 4, at 103 (“This article invites 
courts to resist these formalist trends and . . . require parties to disclose material facts during pre-contractual 
negotiations . . . .  Similarly, risk disclosure may be proper in other one-sided relationships . . . .”). 
 108 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.) (“[T]he owner’s 
duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The 
probability that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of 
adequate precautions.”). 
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A. Limits and Definitions 
As I present this approach, I acknowledge its limits.  Liberal contract 
theory may tell us that consent based on full disclosure is so important to us as 
human beings that we must have it, regardless of cost.109  Nothing I say here 
contradicts that.  Society may value contractual consent for other reasons—to 
bind citizens together as a community or strengthen individuals’ sense of 
autonomy.110  If the goal of our society is indeed to foster expressions of free 
will or the development of rich relationships through the legal system, then 
perhaps robust contractual consent is something for which we are willing to 
pay a lot.111  Subsidizing consent is no odder than subsidizing farms.  But we 
should do so with eyes open to the costs that such a choice incurs.  A theory of 
the cost of consent is useful, even necessary, to those who believe consent is 
indispensable, because at the very least the cost of a thing is a good 
demonstration of its value.112 
For purposes of this discussion, I take liberal contract theory at face value.  
I define consent as informed agreement.113  Consent requires information, 
because a party cannot, under liberal theory, consent to a term of which she is 
unaware.114  Thus, the cost of consent I speak of here is the cost of conveying 
enough information to a mass-market contracting party to ensure that she is 
aware of and understands the terms.  This is how both liberal and economic 
theory encourage information exchange: if the information is communicated, 
the counterparty is bound.115  Legal enforceability is the reward given for 
securing consent by communicating information.116 
 
 109 See Hall, supra note 6, at 572 (“The relativist version . . . is that the more patient understanding and 
participation the better, regardless of the costs to other values entailed in achieving greater autonomy.  The 
absolutist position is even stronger: no valid consent is obtained unless understanding is perfect.”). 
 110 See Barnett, supra note 11, at 297–300 (arguing that voluntary consent is the centerpiece of a workable 
theory of individual entitlements). 
 111 See MACNEIL, supra note 11, at 4 (“By contract I mean no more and no less than the relations among 
parties to the process of projecting exchange into the future. . . .  This, or rather the relations between people 
when this occurs, is what I mean by contract.”). 
 112 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE NATURE OF ECONOMIC REASONING (1998), reprinted in LAW AND 
ECONOMICS ANTHOLOGY 4 (Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Thomas S. Ulen eds., 2002) (“Cost to the economist 
is ‘opportunity cost’—the benefit forgone by employing a resource in a way that denies its use to someone 
else.”). 
 113 See Schuck, supra note 1, at 900 (“To say that one cannot be bound by a promise that one did not 
voluntarily and knowingly make is to say that the individual should be the author of her own 
undertakings . . . .”). 
 114 Id. 
 115 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10, at 127 (“We have shown that when one party to a contract knows 
more than another, the knowledgeable party may strategically decide not to contract around even an inefficient 
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I do not suggest that contract law ought to dispose of consent entirely.  But 
it is worth unpacking the two major roles that consent plays within contracting 
practice.117  The first role is consent to be bound.118  The second role of 
consent is informed consent to the terms of an agreement.119  I do not propose 
to eliminate the former.  Consent to be bound by an agreement must still be 
surrounded by all the pomp and circumstance of contract law to inform parties 
that they are about to enter into binding legal relations.120  Without a robust 
concept of consent to be bound, courts would not know to whom they should 
apply a given contract.121  But that is quite different from the rules regarding 
knowledge of the terms of an agreement.  The jurisprudence of information 
forcing and unconscionability has created an impenetrable thicket of law in 
which courts routinely tell corporations what terms ought to be included, in 
what type-set, and in what order.122  Still, even when corporations do what they 
are told, the courts are often still unsatisfied, and again inform the corporation 
 
default.  Because the process of contracting around a default can reveal information, the knowledgeable party 
may purposefully withhold information to get a larger piece of the smaller contractual pie.  This possibility of 
strategic incompleteness leads us to embrace more diverse forms of default rules.”). 
 116 Id. 
 117 See Stephen E. Friedman, Improving the Rolling Contract, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006) (“The 
proposal, which I refer to as ‘Template Notice,’ is an intermediate form of disclosure that meets the pressing 
concerns of both buyers and sellers.  It would not require sellers to provide the full text of all contract terms 
before or during purchase or order.  It would, however, require sellers to do more than merely give notice that 
unspecified additional terms will be forthcoming.”). 
 118 See id. at 3 (describing how an overall template would allow the transaction to proceed without cutting 
off further discussion of all the terms). 
 119 See id. (suggesting that deferring the terms will make “assent . . . more meaningful”). 
 120 See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800–02 (1941) (describing 
“cautionary” and “channeling” functions of legal formalities, which serve to inform parties that they are about 
to undertake binding legal relations). 
 121 See Barnett, supra note 11, at 302 (“In contract law, this informational or ‘boundary defining’ 
requirement means that an assent to alienate rights must be manifested in some manner by one party to the 
other to serve as a criterion of enforcement. . . .  Without such communication, parties to a transaction (and 
third parties) cannot accurately ascertain what constitutes rightful conduct and what constitutes a commitment 
on which they can rely.”). 
 122 See Fairfield, supra note 97, at 1273 (“Courts often hold standardized contracts to a different standard 
because they deem that consumers have not consented to the deal.”); see also Decker v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 1 
Pa. D. & C.5th 147, 153 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 2007) (involving an insurance coverage document with “headings in 
larger, bold-face type, with a bulleted, single-spaced list”); Raper v. Oliver House, LLC, 637 S.E.2d 551, 552 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (“[A]greement to arbitrate is prominently located on the last page of the contract in bold 
face type, directly above plaintiff’s signature.”); Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 534 N.E.2d 824, 829 
(N.Y. 1988) (“[T]he location and the size of print may, in a proper case, be factors bearing on procedural 
unconscionability . . . .”). 
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that a different term must be bolded in a different place.123  These attempts to 
get information to consumers who reasonably do not want it are misplaced. 
I define “contractual surprise” as the chance that a customer will be 
surprised by a strange contract term, or, conversely, unsurprised by a standard 
term.124  Either the consumer is ignorant of something she should know, or is 
told something she already knows.  If a buyer does not read the contract, there 
is a chance that the contract may contain a surprising non-standard term.  Of 
course, if she does read the contract, she runs the risk of having wasted her 
time if the deal is the standard one. 
One example of contractual surprise might be a prospective buyer of an 
airplane who is surprised to learn that features of the aircraft described in a 
product brochure are disclaimed in the contract for sale.125  Or, software 
purchasers are often surprised at the disclaimer of functionality in the software 
license contract.126  In high-value transactions, preventing contractual surprise 
may be worth the cost.127  But if the term is standardized, and the customer 
already knows it, the benefit of forcing the exchange of the information is nil. 
B. Transaction Costs and Consent 
In determining the optimal standardization of contracts, I treat informed 
consent as a transaction cost.  Here, I ask whether the cost of obtaining a 
party’s consent to terms in a mass-market transaction is worth the trouble. 
 
 123 Compare Net Global Mktg., Inc. v. Dialtone, Inc., 217 F. App’x 598, 600–02 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding 
agreement unconscionable when the document was twelve pages long and contract term was not given its own 
clear heading), with Boghos v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 115 P.3d 68, 74 (Cal. 2005) 
(finding arbitration clause enforceable when provision was the only text bolded). 
 124 See, e.g., A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (“‘Surprise’ 
involves the extent to which the supposedly agreed-upon terms of the bargain are hidden in a prolix printed 
form drafted by the party seeking to enforce the disputed terms.”). 
 125 See Betaco, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 103 F.3d 1281, 1282–83 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the 
purchase agreement was fully integrated, and therefore, a contractual disclaimer effectively negated warranty 
statements made in aircraft product brochure). 
 126 See, e.g., M. Block & Sons, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 04-C-340, 2004 WL 1557631, at *8–
*9 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2004) (holding that the disclaimer was conspicuous, and therefore, enforceable). 
 127 See Fairfield, supra note 97, at 1260 (“Parties tend to negotiate capital purchases such as equipment or 
real estate development: no amount of search can create the precise deal that the buyer desires, so some degree 
of customization must occur.”). 
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In the familiar tort formulation, courts and theorists minimize the cost sum 
of precautions and accidents.128  Precautions are good things.  But the strength 
of economic analysis lies in telling us when there has been too much of a good 
thing.  In torts, for example, economic analysis can tell us that a given 
precaution could both save lives and be too expensive.129 
By analogy, courts should minimize costs when the sum of costs is the cost 
of informed consent to a given contractual term plus the cost created by 
surprise (for example, an accident caused by not reading some disclosure about 
a product).  First, the burden of an additional contractual disclosure is the sum 
of reading and writing costs.  It costs sellers to draft, print, and draw attention 
to terms, and it costs consumers to read those additional terms.  When the cost 
of getting informed consent is greater than the benefit of preventing surprise, 
then courts ought not to use information-forcing rules to force informed 
consent. 
In a nod to the famous tort formulation, courts should not use coercive 
information-forcing rules when the burden (B) of the additional disclosure 
outweighs the chance of the information being relevant (P) times the damage 
caused by letting the consumer live in ignorance (L), or when B > PL.  In other 
words, when a contractual disclosure is more expensive in terms of time or 
money than letting a consumer be surprised by the content of the contract, 
courts should let the consumer be surprised.  Further, note that PL is likely to 
be quite low if the term is standardized, because the consumer is likely aware 
of the term and thus is not surprised in any event. 
An example may be helpful.  Suppose a customer, with one dollar in her 
pocket, wishes to buy a cup of hot coffee from a fast-food chain.  The cost of 
the coffee is fifty cents.  However, suppose courts require the corporation to 
convey information to the consumer (on pain of liability) in the form of a 
 
 128 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.) (“Possibly it 
serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the injury, L; 
and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL.”). 
 129 There is an argument that lives are infinitely valuable, and thus cost–benefit analyses are useless when 
lives are at stake.  When risks are aggregated across millions of people, precautions appear to directly save a 
certain number of lives.  And if lives are infinitely valuable, then any precaution must be efficient.  But this 
does not appear to be so.  A better way of discussing the question is to note that people take non-zero risks 
with their lives all the time, and express measurable willingness to pay to avoid some risks, while they appear 
willing to bear other risks.  If lives were truly infinitely valuable, I would never drive a car again.  If lives were 
not very valuable, I would drive a car with little protection.  Because I drive a car with a high crash-test rating, 
the truth seems to be somewhere in between.  I am willing to pay for enough precautions to avoid some risks, 
but not to eliminate all risk. 
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contractual disclosure written on the cup indicating that the coffee is “VERY 
HOT!!!”  The disclosure incurs printing costs of an additional five cents per 
cup, which are borne by the consumer.  This is not improbable, because an 
information-forcing requirement is likely to result in all coffee-sellers raising 
their costs, thus leaving little room for a customer to avoid the additional cost 
by going to a competitor. 
There are three efficiency effects in this instance: first, the customer may 
not be able to purchase the fifty-cent danish that she prefers with her coffee 
because she has now spent too much on coffee.  (This is illustrated in Figure 1 
in the next section.)  Second, she may decide not to buy the coffee because she 
is one of the few people for whom the fifty-cent coffee was the absolute 
maximum she would pay.  (This is shown in Figure 2 in the next section.)  And 
finally, there is a serious chance that she knew already that the coffee was 
likely to come piping hot, and thus any cost incurred in informing her of this 
fact is an absolute waste. 
The next sections illustrate this approach, using an indifference curve and a 
supply–demand curve.  The cost of informed consent in mass-market 
contracting not only affects individual decisions, but can be aggregated across 
all transactions in a given market.  Thus, the following section seeks to 
demonstrate the cost of consent both to individual consumers and to total 
social welfare. 
C. Illustrating the Cost of Consent 
There are two ways to show the costs of information-forcing rules to 
consumers.  The first involves an indifference curve.130  In this figure, we have 
a budget constraint, line A, representing the money that a consumer has to split 
between good G (on the X axis) and all other goods (on the Y axis).  We also 
have an indifference curve, curve C, that represents the utility of different 
mixes of goods that the consumer might choose to buy.131  The line is curved 
because people prefer a mix of goods.  Most people prefer a glass of milk and a 
cookie to two glasses of milk or two cookies.132  And it would take a lot of 
milk to make up for having no cookies at all. 
 
 130 See infra fig.1. 
 131 See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 97 (10th ed. 
2006) (“Any two points on the same indifference curve . . . represent two combinations of the goods that the 
consumer likes equally well.”). 
 132 See Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 149, 181 (2001) 
(“Most people prefer to have three cookies and one glass of milk than to have four cookies.”). 
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The consumer’s preferred allocation is represented by point E, where the 
indifference curve is tangent to the budget constraint.  All points on C have the 
same utility to the consumer, and all points to the left of C have less utility, so 
E is where the consumer’s budget can buy her the most utility. 
Suppose that a court employs an information-forcing rule to require a 
manufacturer to sell (and the consumer to buy) the communication of more 
information about good G than the consumer would desire.  By forcing the 
consumer to spend more money on information about good G, a court will 
reduce the amount of good G that a customer can buy with her budget.  This 
moves the budget constraint to line A′: the new mixes of goods that the 
customer can afford.  The indifference curve C′ that is tangent to A′ indicates 
E′, the point of greatest utility on A′.  E′ is the point at which the consumer can 
afford the mix of good G (with court-required information) and other goods 
that maximize her utility.  Although a consumer is indifferent to the mix of 
goods on any given curve, she is not indifferent between curves.  The shift 
from budget constraint A to A′ puts her in an inferior position, point E′, which 
she is forced to adopt by a court’s information-forcing rule.   
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By forcing a consumer to buy more information associated with good G, 
courts would cause a consumer to substitute other goods for good G and would 
leave less wealth for her to buy other goods that she may want, decreasing her 
overall spending power.  The first effect is called the substitution effect, which 
represents the fact that the consumer would have to increase her consumption 
of other goods and reduce her purchases of good G from Q1 to Q2 in order to 
remain indifferent to the change in price of good G.  Of course, the consumer 
does not have enough money to do this (that is, the consumer’s budget is A′ 
rather than A*, which is the budget she would need to reach E*, the tangent 
point between her new budget slope and her old indifference curve), and so 
there is a second effect, called the income effect.  The income effect 
demonstrates that as a result of the price increase of G, the consumer has less 
wealth to buy all goods, G included.  The resulting decrease in good G 
purchases is shown by the distance from Q2 to Q3.  The substitution effect and 
the income effect together reflect the amount by which the consumer will 
decrease her purchases of good G.  And the shift from C to C′ shows that the 
consumer is worse off across the board: any point on C′ is worse than any point 
on C. 
It is also possible to show the economic impact of information-forcing rules 
using a straightforward demand curve.133  Here, the price of good G is on the Y 
axis, and the quantity of good G produced is on the X axis.  Supply is mapped 
by an upward-sloping line, here line S, representing the cost to the supplier of 
producing the marginal good. 
 
 133 See infra fig.2. 
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The higher the price for a commodity, the greater the supply—thus the 
positive slope to the line.  Demand is mapped as a downward-sloping line, here 
line D, representing the utility of consumers who purchase the goods.  As long 
as consumer utility is higher than seller’s cost of production, the seller will 
make the good and the buyer will buy it.  The slope of the demand curve is 
negative because as price increases, the quantity demanded decreases.  
Correspondingly, as price decreases, the quantity demanded increases.  The 
intersection of the supply and demand curves, point K, represents the price that 
will encourage the optimal production of goods in society. 
Meddling with this balance can throw things off.  Suppose that a court 
adopts an information-forcing rule that requires a supplier to sell, and 
consumers to buy, more information about the product or service in order to 
generate “informed consent,” on pain of unenforceability.  This raises the costs 
of the supplier, by tacking the cost of the information onto the price of good G.  
The supply curve shifts to the left, indicating the increase in the cost of 
production at all points.  The new line, S′, intersects with D at point K′. 
FAIRFIELD GALLEYFINAL 6/2/2009  12:28:13 PM 
2009] THE COST OF CONSENT 1431 
Some people may be willing to pay the greater price, even though it leaves 
less room in their budgets for other goods they may have wanted to buy.134  
But some percentage of the population would not be willing to bear the extra 
cost.  They will take that money and purchase other goods, which yield less 
utility to them than good G would have.  Those lost trades of good G are 
deadweight loss, and are indicated by the shaded triangle. 
As shown by these admittedly simple graphs, information-forcing rules run 
the risk of requiring consumers to purchase more information than they desire.  
Courts often do this when they require additional disclosures in contracts, or 
hold a contract unenforceable for failure to adequately disclose terms.  This 
causes consumers to suboptimally allocate their own resources, and it causes 
some proportion of gainful trades to fall through.  The reader might protest that 
these increases in cost are not very much, because the cost of including an 
additional contract term is not very great.  Yet in mass-market contracts, the 
surplus to be divided between buyer and seller may be very small.  The 
additional cost may therefore matter in enough cases to decrease overall social 
welfare significantly.135 
III.  THE BENEFITS OF STANDARDIZATION 
The prior Part demonstrated that where the cost of mandatory information 
transfer outweighs its benefit, parties rationally do not—and should not—read 
contracts in order to consent to terms.  But some information-forcing rules are 
permissive, not mandatory.136  Such rules encourage parties to reveal 
idiosyncratic information about themselves when it is efficient for the 
contracting parties to do so.137  This Part argues that even permissive 
information-forcing rules may be inefficient overall, where the information 
costs that customized deals impose on third parties outweigh the benefits of the 
 
 134 See supra fig.1. 
 135 For an examination of the cost of useless labels in commercial products, see Parish v. Jumpking, Inc., 
719 N.W.2d 540, 545–46 (Iowa 2006) (describing a myriad of separate warning labels on a trampoline). 
 136 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10, at 103 (“The uninformed party, the carrier, may attempt to learn 
the expected damages of the informed parties, the millers, by offering a menu of insurance contracts.  The 
millers might then be induced to self-select the insurance contract that is optimal for their expected damages.” 
(discussing Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (Exch. Div.))). 
 137 See Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151 (“Now, if the special circumstances under which the contract was 
actually made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus known to both parties, the 
damages resulting from the breach of such a contract, which they would reasonably contemplate, would be the 
amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under these special circumstances so 
known and communicated.”). 
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contracting parties.  I further argue that consumers, who search for deals, 
prefer standardized deals because standardization reduces consumer 
information costs.138 
I then apply these insights to several problems in contract law.  Courts 
often speak as though their role is to enable a broad range of contractual choice 
and encourage informed consent by eliminating standard contracts.139  I 
demonstrate that courts instead often act sub silentio to reduce options, limit 
individualized negotiation, and thus reduce information costs.  I further 
demonstrate that courts use supposedly anti-standardization doctrines like 
unconscionability and adhesion instead to standardize agreements within a 
given industry.  Courts standardize contracts by eliminating contractual 
outliers: those contracts which deviate sufficiently from the norm such that 
they raise information costs for all parties. 
A. Contract Information Externalities 
This section analyzes the effect of information-forcing regimes on third 
parties.  The first subsection explains how customization increases information 
costs to third parties.  The second subsection demonstrates how standardization 
can lower information costs to third parties. 
1. Customization Increases Information Costs to Third Parties 
The benefits of standardization (and the concurrent costs of idiosyncratic 
agreements reached by informed, negotiated consent) affect not only the 
parties who negotiate the agreement, but every other party who wishes to enter 
into a transaction of similar kind.140  Recall the example of the exploding 
microwave.141  If the consumer does not desire to purchase insurance against a 
microwave explosion, then it is efficient, as between consumer and seller, for 
 
 138 See Fairfield, supra note 97, at 1256 (“The franchise system creates information economies for 
potential diners, not just production benefits for the franchisee.  The same economies exist in contract: Parties 
often prefer the standard deal to an idiosyncratic one.”). 
 139 See Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 939–45 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding standardized 
arbitration provision unenforceable because it lacked mutuality, and contained terms favoring franchisor over 
franchisee); Comb v. Paypal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1172–77 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (finding standardized 
contract compelling arbitration unenforceable as unconscionable because of specific content of terms 
governing mutuality, venue, costs of arbitration, etc.). 
 140 For the value of these standard practices to industries, see Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering 
Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1746 (1996) (evaluating whether rules established by industries are 
efficient, and arguing that private ordering means more than mere absence of state regulation). 
 141 See supra text accompanying note 93. 
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the parties to disclaim liability for personal injury in the event of negligent 
manufacture.  But the cost of the idiosyncratic damages waiver falls on third 
parties, who now must inspect their contracts for the customized term. 
The lens of information costs can help explain why courts interpret terms 
consistently with standard trade or industry understandings of terms, while 
often rejecting the idiosyncratic interpretations advanced by the parties before 
the court.  Case illustrations may help cement the point.  L & A Contracting 
Co. v. Southern Concrete Services, Inc. considered the impact that an 
idiosyncratic definition of “default” would have on the broader industry of 
surety providers.142  The court determined that the definition of “default” 
proffered by L & A was impractical because it departed from the industry 
meaning of the term.143  The court noted: “A definition of a contract term that 
leads to impractical or commercially absurd results is unreasonable. . . .  
Sureties deprived of a clear rule for notices of default would be reluctant to 
enter into otherwise profitable contracts.”144  The terms of the individual 
contract before the court mattered less than the impact of the term across the 
construction and surety industries. 
Given that parties are usually free to define their own contract terms, the 
result in L & A Contracting Co. is startling.  Under traditional contract theory, 
that case is either an outlier or wrongly decided.145  But the lens of 
information-cost theory permits us to see why the court rejected the contractual 
definition of default in favor of the industry definition.  The cost to other 
members of the industry of no longer knowing what “default” meant would 
have been greater than the benefit of the customized default term to the parties 
in the case.  The court prevented the costs to the industry of the private 
agreement by rejecting the idiosyncratic contract term. 
Courts do not always reject idiosyncratic definitions.  Often they will 
instead use interpretive rules that exert a gravitational pull on contract terms.  
Thus, a “definition . . . must be determined in light of reasonable industry 
custom and usage . . . even though words in their ordinary or legal meaning are 
unambiguous.”146  Judge Learned Hand’s formulation is similarly striking: “I 
 
 142 17 F.3d 106, 110–11 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 See Caulkins Indiantown Citrus Co. v. Nevins Fruit Co., 831 So.2d 727, 735 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) 
(“[W]here a contract is clear and unambiguous, the express contract terms may not be varied by resort to 
extrinsic evidence, including that related to the UCC obligation of good faith or custom and usage.”). 
 146 Stender v. Twin City Foods, Inc., 510 P.2d 221, 225 (Wash. 1973). 
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cannot see why judges should not hold men to understandings which are the 
tacit presupposition on which they deal.”147  These cases are traditionally 
understood as purely interpretive.  Under the conventional view, industry 
custom is supposed to supplement, not supplant, contractual terms.148  But 
courts do more than merely resolve ambiguity by reference to custom and 
practice.  They actively interpret terms in ways that remove idiosyncrasies that 
might raise contracting costs across the industry.149  This gravitational pull 
exerts a constant pressure on contract terms to conform to the standard 
understanding, and reduces the industry-wide impact of customized deals. 
Consider the case of Arc & Gas Welder Associates, Inc. v. Green Fuel 
Economizer Co.150  The subcontractor, Green, hired Arc to provide steel plates, 
polished to a “No. 4 finish.”151  The general contract called for a polish with no 
pits, cracks, or crevices.152  Green maintained that the “No. 4 finish” 
contemplated in its contract with Arc required such smoothness as well.153  The 
court rejected that argument, finding that standard industry practice for 
polishing “means a smoothness which does not exceed 42 micro-inches, 
resulting in a surface without pits,” ignoring the cracks and crevices 
requirement from the contract.154  In justifying its argument, the court noted 
that “the parties used terms which had a definite meaning in the industry and 
may not now be heard to say that they did not use the terms as the industry 
understood them.”155  Industry players are not allowed to offer their own 
idiosyncratic definition of terms the industry relied upon for clarity.  Instead, 
the court pulls such outliers toward the industry standard, because such 
idiosyncratic interpretations would increase costs for all other industry 
contracts. 
 
 147 Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc., 299 F. 991, 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (Hand, J.). 
 148 See Caulkins, 831 So.2d at 733 (“Generally, where the language of a contract is ambiguous, parol 
evidence is admissible to explain or clarify the intention of the parties.”). 
 149 See L & A Contracting Co., 17 F.3d at 111 (“Sureties deprived of a clear rule for notices of default 
would be reluctant to enter into otherwise profitable contracts.”). 
 150 285 F.2d 863 (4th Cir. 1960). 
 151 Id. at 864. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. at 866. 
 154 Id. at 867. 
 155 Id. at 868. 
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2. Standardization Lowers Information Costs for Third Parties 
The traditional view is that standardized agreements hide terms and raise 
information costs.156  But viewed through the lens of information-cost theory, 
it is clear that standardized agreements reduce information costs for parties 
who are searching for the set of contract terms that they desire.  Suppose 
peanut butter manufacturers made only one type of peanut butter.  If a 
customer desires to purchase peanut butter, the process is quick and easy: there 
is only one kind to buy.  The customer will admittedly suffer frustration costs 
if she prefers extra chunky peanut butter.  But her frustration costs may be less 
than the benefit of having a streamlined purchasing process.  Suppose instead 
that the purchasing consumer now faces a store shelf stocked with peanut 
butter that is chunky, extra chunky, reduced fat creamy, reduced fat super 
chunky, natural creamy, crunchy, cinnamon-raisin, white chocolate, smooth, 
creamy, honey-roasted, organic, unsalted, soy, mixed with jelly, “The Heat is 
On” spiced, or in a squeeze bottle.  Frustration costs will be low because the 
consumer can purchase precisely what she wants.  But this comes at a cost; 
verifying the correct type of peanut butter takes extra time in the aisle.  The 
consumer cannot grab and go. 
The peanut butter example relies on the features of a product to make a 
point about standardization.  It is only one step from peanut butter to contract 
terms.  Imagine a consumer who, instead of choosing a standard warranty, 
must choose from many different individuated options.  The cost of informed 
choice rises for each additional permutation presented. 
B. Direct Benefits of Standardization to Consumers 
This explains why consumers desire standard deals.  Consumers search for 
deals that contain the mix of contract terms and product features that they 
desire.157  They spend more time as third parties searching for a contract than 
they do negotiating terms within a contract.158  That is: if Party A (a consumer) 
enters into an idiosyncratic contract with Party B (a supplier), Party C (another 
 
 156 See A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (“‘Surprise’ 
involves the extent to which the supposedly agreed-upon terms of the bargain are hidden in a prolix printed 
form drafted by the party seeking to enforce the disputed terms.”). 
 157 See Fairfield, supra note 97, at 1240 (“[I]nquiring buyers might go to a website to compare prices, 
guarantees, and warranty terms already on offer.”). 
 158 See id. (“The primary cost of contracting is not in negotiating the fine details of the contract with the 
store; the cost of contracting is finding a store that sells the desired product coupled with the desired 
contract.”). 
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consumer) suffers higher information costs.  Consumers therefore rationally 
respond to information costs.  They care more about information externalities 
that raise the costs of searching than they do about dickering terms within an 
agreement.  Traditional theory analyzes consumers as though they had already 
entered a contract.159  But consumers do most of their work in the pre-
contractual moment; they search for deals they desire rather than negotiate for 
them.160  Consumers prefer standardized deals because they reduce the costs of 
search in the pre-contractual moment. 
The traditional explanation for why consumers prefer standardized 
contracts, that drafting cost-savings result in lower prices, seems incomplete.  
It is unclear that companies will pass the savings along rather than pocketing 
the profits.  Imagine a competitive market at equilibrium: the point at which no 
company can unilaterally depart downward in price and make money.161  Now 
suppose Company A develops a new standardized contract.  Company A could 
try to steal customers from competitors by using the saved drafting costs to 
depart downward in price.  But standardized contract language gives no 
competitive advantage because it is not proprietary.162  Other companies would 
copy the standardized language, and could depart downward as well.  In fact, 
other companies would save even more, because they did not incur the original 
drafting costs or the costs of fireproofing the boilerplate in litigation.163  The 
result would be reduced profits for all sellers.  Thus, it is more likely that 
corporations will therefore simply pocket drafting cost savings. 
The drafter-centered view of standardization ignores a significant portion 
of the benefits that standardization creates within modern commercial 
 
 159 See Isler v. Tex. Oil & Gas Corp., 749 F.2d 22, 23 (10th Cir. 1984) (“The very notion of contract is the 
consensual formation of relationships with bargained-for duties.”). 
 160 See Fairfield, supra note 97, at 1240 (“[P]rospective purchasers search for counterparties that offer the 
set of contract terms they desire.”). 
 161 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 21 (1994) (“[N]o player could do better 
by choosing a different strategy given the strategy the other chooses.  The strategy of each player must be a 
best response to the strategies of the other.”). 
 162 Although he did so in his proposal for pre-approved contract terms, Clayton Gillette summarized the 
problem with non-proprietary contract terms:  
Because approved contracts of necessity become publicly available after administrative 
endorsement . . . and can be mimicked by competing sellers who did not contribute to the process 
of obtaining approval, sellers may refrain from submitting proposals in order to free ride off the 
efforts of competitors without incurring any of the commensurate costs or downside risks.   
Clayton P. Gillette, Pre-Approved Contracts for Internet Commerce, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 975, 989 (2005). 
 163 Id. 
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markets.164 While producers may benefit from standardization by reducing 
production costs and benefiting from economies of scale, products benefit from 
economies of demand as well.  Most basically, the more people use the 
standard, the more the standard becomes useful.165 
Imagine a manufacturer of electric cords.  It is true that standardization 
does lower the manufacturing costs to the factory owner.  Using the same base 
template over and over again is the foundation of the Industrial Revolution.  
But there is another reason that the manufacturer of electrical cords finds such 
a ready market for identical cords.  Consumers benefit from standardization 
that goes beyond the cost-savings analysis realized by the manufacturer 
through economies of scale and repetition.  Standardization benefits consumers 
because consumers do not need to inquire upon purchasing an item with an 
electric cord whether that cord will fit the sockets in the consumer’s wall.  The 
customer may purchase a cord more swiftly and with less inquiry, and be more 
certain of a positive result.  These reduced information costs benefit the 
consumer directly because the consumer spends less time shopping for the 
“right” electrical cord.  This is a direct savings to the consumer. 
The same concept applies to contracts.  Consumers save time (and thus 
money) when they accept “the standard deal,” rather than learn the particulars 
of a specifically negotiated contract.166 This Article argues that contracts 
benefit from economies of demand in the same manner that products benefit 
from economies of demand.  The terms of a contract become more valuable—
and desirable—the more people know, understand, and use them because the 
more people use standard terms, the less expensive contracting becomes for 
 
 164 See Fairfield, supra note 97, at 1256 (“For example, travelers on the interstate highway system may 
well choose to go to a franchise restaurant not only because the restaurants routinely benefit from economies 
of scale that allow them to pass along lower costs to the consumer but also because the travelers know what to 
expect.”). 
 165 See Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 58, at 33 n.127 (stating that standardization in 
manufacturing has the twin benefits of facilitating economies of scale and of reducing transaction costs by, 
inter alia, reducing the need for monitoring (citing Charles P. Kindleberger, Standards as Public, Collective 
and Private Goods, 36 KYKLOS 377, 378, 384 (1983))); William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: 
Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1741–42 (1999) (stating that 
standardization carries with it many benefits, including the reduction of “data collection and processing 
costs”). 
 166 See Fairfield, supra note 97, at 1274 (“Yet at least some theory of contract ought to be incensed when 
consumers are required to read contracts.  The cost of doing so is considerable, especially as a proportion of 
the expected gain to be realized out of the trade.  Let us say a consumer values his time at ten dollars per hour.  
If a contractual relationship takes an hour to fully comprehend, a consumer faced with even a pro-
standardization regime will prefer not to undertake the trade if he is required to read the contract.”). 
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everyone.167  The converse is also true—the more customization that parties 
use in their contracts, the more expensive contracting becomes for everyone 
else. 
C. Courts and Standardization 
Given the above analysis, contract law ought to minimize information costs 
to third parties.  Courts can reduce information costs to consumers by 
enforcing standardized agreements.168  To do so, however, courts must evolve 
beyond traditional contract theory.  Current theory holds that a court’s function 
is to enable choice and facilitate individualized information transfer.169  This 
section argues that courts can and should abandon the rhetoric of negotiated 
agreement and instead constrain individualized negotiations to preserve a 
uniform standard and reduce information costs.  Legal theory also seems to 
mulct standardized contracts for lack of consent under the doctrines of 
adhesion and unconscionability.170  This section demonstrates that courts do 
not use anti-standardization doctrines to limit standardized contracts.  Instead, 
courts (not without irony) often use anti-standardization doctrines to eliminate 
contractual outliers and promote standardization.171 
 
 167 See infra Part IV.A; see also Fairfield, supra note 97, at 1255 (“As before, if the meeting of the minds 
between two parties as to idiosyncratic contract terms (or idiosyncratic interpretations of a previously settled 
and standardized term) is given effect, the broader contracting community suffers higher search costs.”). 
 168 See C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 177 (Iowa 1975) (“[T]he burglary 
‘definition’ which crept into this policy comports neither with the concept a layman might have of that crime, 
nor with a legal interpretation.”). 
 169 See supra note 139 (discussing the prevailing theory that customers prefer standardization because it 
reduces consumer information costs). 
 170 See Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 627 (2002) (“Yet 
contract theorists are nothing if not suspicious of such contracts, having long ago dubbed them pejoratively 
‘contracts of adhesion.’  Indeed, I would wager that a plurality of contracts teachers would favor a judicial 
refusal to enforce form contracts altogether . . . .”). 
 171 See, e.g., Sw. Pet Prods., Inc. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1113–14 (D. Ariz. 2000) 
(holding that “substantive unconscionability focuses on the terms of the contract . . .  [and] it appears that the 
terms were standard in the industry”); Bennett v. Behring Corp., 466 F. Supp. 689, 697 (S.D. Fla. 1979) 
(explaining that “the Court must compare the price actually being paid by the complaining party, to the price 
being paid by other similarly situated consumers in a similar transaction”); Reznor v. J. Artist Mgmt., Inc., 
365 F. Supp. 2d 565, 577 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (relying on the fact that “no . . . evidence that the objected-to 
provisions in the . . . agreement were unusual for the industry”); Cal. Grocers Ass’n v. Bank of Am., 27 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 396, 402 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (“Bank of America’s $3 DIR fee is actually at the low end of prices 
charged . . . by other financial institutions, many of which charge between $4 and $10.”); Carboni v. 
Arrospide, 2 Cal. Rptr. 845, 849 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (“We have little trouble concluding that an interest rate 
of 200 percent . . . is substantively unconscionable . . . .  [T]he interest rate . . . was approximately ten times 
the rate then prevailing in the credit market for similar loans.”); Fotomat Corp. of Fla. v. Chanda, 464 So.2d 
626, 630 (Fla. App. Dist. 1985) (noting that “the limitation of liability provision was standard in the industry” 
and that “[t]his is clearly a commercially reasonable consideration”); Retail Credit Corp. v. Shorterage, No. 
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1. The Numerus Clausus in Contract 
Contract law has not been traditionally understood as offering a limited 
number of contractual forms.  The traditional understanding of the role of 
courts in contract cases is that they should facilitate negotiated choice.172  
Freedom of contract is as close to a universal positive principle as is accepted 
in contract law.173  Instead, this Article proposes that courts should and 
sometimes do constrain choice and limit the range of contractual language in 
the mass-market context rather than enable idiosyncratic deals that raise 
information costs.  Doctrines that constrain negotiated choice and limit the 
range of contractual terms should govern mass-market, high-volume, low-
value cases, while doctrines enabling individual preferences and idiosyncratic 
understandings should govern low-volume, high-value, dickered cases.  To 
some extent courts have already adopted this division, although haphazardly 
and sub silentio.  This Article first explores those instances in which courts 
already constrain choice and language to keep contracts standardized.  In 
response to these situations, this Article then proposes some changes courts 
could make to further encourage standardization and limit information costs in 
the mass-market context. 
a. The Statute of Frauds and Parol Evidence 
Commercial law constrains the range of contractual choice and 
standardizes agreements by requiring contracts to be in writing.174  Once there 
is a writing, courts limit evidence of negotiations between the parties that 
occurred prior to or contemporaneous with the writing.175  Under the parol 
evidence rule, courts therefore discard evidence of actual negotiations between 
 
69465, 1996 WL 199831, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 25, 1996) (“[I]n determining . . . substantive 
unconscionability, this court must consider the interest rates which have been held to be ‘commercially 
reasonable.’” (citing Collins v. Click Camera & Video, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1294, 1299 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) 
(noting that “courts examining whether a particular limitations clause is substantively unconscionable have 
considered . . . the standard in the industry”))); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 970 P.2d 
803, 812 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (“Such clauses are standard in the software industry . . . .  Indeed, they are 
useful in making software affordable.”); U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2002) (“The basic test is whether, in the light 
of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses 
involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making 
of the contract.”). 
 172 See supra Part II.A. 
 173 See supra Part II.A. 
 174 U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (2002) (“[A] contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not 
enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some writing . . . .”). 
 175 § 2-202 (“[A] final expression of their agreement . . . may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior 
agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement . . . .”). 
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the parties.176  Courts may, however, consider usage of trade to explain 
contract terms.177  The effect of the parol evidence rule is that courts substitute 
the general community’s understanding of the standard meanings of terms in 
place of any negotiated meaning not incorporated into the writing. 178 
Indeed, the parol evidence rule only excludes evidence of negotiations over 
idiosyncratic terms.  Suppose Party A and Party B negotiate a contract: A and B 
may choose the standard shipping term, FOB Seller’s place of business; or a 
different term—FOB Buyer’s place of business.179  If A and B desire the 
standard term but fail to include it in the contract, the term can come in under 
the trade-use exception.180  However, if A and B negotiated for an idiosyncratic 
shipping rule but forgot to include that term in the contract, all evidence of 
those negotiated preferences would be excluded by the court as impermissible 
extrinsic evidence, because the idiosyncratic term would fall outside the scope 
of standard trade use or course of dealing.181  The parol evidence rule is 
therefore best understood as a rule that reduces the information costs 
associated with contracting. 
Information-cost theory helps explain why courts purport to enforce the 
negotiated preferences of the parties, yet exclude all evidence of such 
negotiations under the parol evidence rule.  The parol evidence rule is not a 
rule about good evidence.  If courts wanted good evidence, they would not 
exclude probative evidence of the actual intent of the parties in reaching an 
agreement.  The actual effect of the rule is to exclude evidence of a negotiating 
process that would be highly likely to provide useful information about 
idiosyncratic terms that the parties desired.182 
 
 176 See St. Johns N. F. Shipping Corp. v. S. A. Companhia Geral Commercial do Rio de Janeiro, 263 U.S. 
119, 120 (1923) (summarizing petitioner’s argument and discussing, in a positive way, earlier cases where 
“testimony was offered to modify the custom by an oral contract, and [two state supreme courts] refused to 
admit such evidence on the ground of the parol evidence rule”). 
 177 § 2-202 (stating that contract terms “may be explained or supplemented . . . by course of performance, 
course of dealing, or usage of trade”). 
 178 See Porto Rico Sugar Co. v. Lorenzo, 222 U.S. 481, 482 (1912) (finding that parol evidence of the 
local grinding season based on industry practice properly was admitted to determine the time of performance, 
which was not specified in a contract to grind sugarcane). 
 179 §§ 2-308, 2-319, 2-509. 
 180 See § 2-202 (discussing the significance of “a course of dealing” or “usage of trade” to the parol 
evidence rule). 
 181 See id. (discussing the concept of “merger” in final contract drafting). 
 182 See Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (“A contract has, strictly 
speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties.  A contract is an obligation 
attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and 
represent a known intent.”). 
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b. Trade Use and Industry Custom and Practice 
Trade use and industry standards shape judicial interpretation of contract 
terms.183  Courts adopt industry standards as default rules.184  When 
determining if a product is too expensive, courts compare the price to the 
standard market rate.185  When measuring whether a contract term is 
unconscionable, courts look to standard practice.186  When construing the 
meaning of terms, courts look to how the term is defined within the industry.187 
The concept of “industry” itself is important for standardization.  In 
contract law, each industry provides its own legal box within which it may 
control and establish standards.188  This permits courts to tailor standard terms 
for that industry without worrying that those terms will be applied in other 
contexts.  The effect of the legal concept of an industry is thus to limit 
spillover.  Standardized contracts must be isolated on an industry-by-industry 
basis.  If courts were to apply standardized terms from the shoe-selling 
industry to a law professor’s employment contract, there would likely be 
confusion.  Within each box, courts create a gravitational pull toward a 
standardized contract. 
c. Standard Default Terms 
Courts also standardize contracts by filling contract gaps with default terms 
that operate in the absence of contractual language by the parties.  These rules 
are often drawn from the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), which derives 
many of its default terms from industry standards.189  Prevailing economic 
theory classifies default rules according to two categories: majoritarian defaults 
and penalty defaults.  A majoritarian default is an optimal default contract term 
 
 183 See Elizabeth Warren, Trade Usage and Parties in the Trade: An Economic Rationale for an Inflexible 
Rule, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 515 (1981) (“In commercial litigation, courts most frequently interpret contract terms 
according to the usage of the trade.  That is, courts will give the disputed term the meaning it carries in similar 
business settings.”). 
 184 See infra Part III.C.1.c–d. 
 185 See infra Part III.C.1.c–d. 
 186 See infra Part III.C.1.c–d. 
 187 See Warren, supra note 183, at 518 (“Uniformly charging all parties in a trade with knowledge of a 
trade usage benefits everyone established in the trade by reducing their transactions costs.”). 
 188 See In re Tolona Pizza Prods. Corp., 3 F.3d 1029, 1033 (7th Cir. 1993) (“We conclude that ‘ordinary 
business terms’ refers to the range of terms that encompasses the practices in which firms similar in some 
general way to the creditor in question engage, and that only dealings so idiosyncratic as to fall outside that 
broad range should be deemed extraordinary and therefore outside the scope . . . .”). 
 189 See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(3), 1-205 (2002) (defining “agreement” to include course of dealing, usage of 
trade or course of performance and defining “usage of trade,” respectively). 
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chosen by the court on behalf of the parties, based on the theory that the parties 
would have wanted that term if they had negotiated over the provision.190  A 
penalty default is a suboptimal default contract term imposed by courts to 
encourage the parties to bargain around the default.191  Notably, neither theory 
explains why most contracting parties choose to use standard agreements that 
must in some respect be suboptimal between them, but still refrain from 
bargaining around them. 
This Article proposes to construct default rules differently.  A useful 
default rule is neither that which the majority of parties would have used if 
they had bargained, nor a rule designed to be suboptimal and force information 
exchange.  A good default rule instead reinforces industry standards in order to 
reduce the information costs of other industry parties.192  This may closely 
resemble a majoritarian default.  But there remains a critical difference 
between a majoritarian default and an industry standard: a standard is the rule 
chosen (or not chosen) by most parties given transaction costs.  The standard is 
a creature of transaction costs insofar as the goal of a standard is to minimize 
such costs.  By comparison, a majoritarian default is the one parties would 
have selected absent transaction costs.193  Or, in common-sense terms: a court 
might wisely enforce standardized rules that reduce information costs, but that 
do not reflect the choice that most parties would make if they were able to 
bargain costlessly. 
Information-cost theory explains how default rules can be suboptimal 
between any given set of contracting parties, yet optimal for the industry as a 
whole.  Contracting parties prospectively search for contracts they may want to 
enter, rather than retrospectively seeking to fine tune a deal they have already 
entered.194  The information cost of simple, commonly held terms is low.195  
 
 190 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10, at 93 (“Scholars who attribute contractual incompleteness to 
transaction costs are naturally drawn toward choosing defaults that the majority of contracting parties ‘would 
have wanted’ because these majoritarian defaults seem to minimize the costs of contracting.”). 
 191 See id. at 91 (“Penalty defaults are designed to give at least one party to the contract an incentive to 
contract around the default rule and therefore to choose affirmatively the contract provision they prefer.”). 
 192 See id. (“An ‘untailored default,’ true to its etymology, provides the parties to all contracts with a 
single, off-the-rack standard that in some sense represents what the majority of contracting parties would 
want.”); see also Warren, supra note 183, at 518 (“In the long run, widespread application of the standard 
benefits trade newcomers as well by causing those established in the trade to deal with them on the same terms 
as others in the trade.”). 
 193 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10, at 93. 
 194 See POSNER, supra note 112, at 5 (“Rational people base their decisions on their expectations of the 
future rather than on their regrets about the past.”); see also Fairfield, supra note 97, at 1240 (“The primary 
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The information cost of individuated deals is high.196  Industry parties who 
repeatedly contract may want to use standard language and leave industry 
standards intact even though there might be some benefit to deviating from the 
industry norm and employing uniquely negotiated terms. 
Supplying default terms reduces the degree to which a contract can vary 
from the standard.197  For example, if a contract deviates in its price term from 
the norm, its warranty provisions may still be standardized.  If a contract 
deviates from the norm by offering an idiosyncratic disclaimer of liability, it 
may still be standardized in terms of price.  Default rules offer a gravitational 
pull toward the norm. 
d. The Battle of the Forms 
The knockout rule’s infamous gloss on U.C.C. section 2-207 is also best 
understood as a doctrine designed to restrict individuated negotiation in order 
to protect the informational benefits of standardized terms.  The common 
understanding of the knockout rule is that if parties’ terms differ, they are 
knocked out, and the U.C.C. default is applied.198  However, courts will often 
look to industry standards before applying the U.C.C. default to determine 
whether there is a more tailored term for the particular industry.199  For 
example, courts apply section 2-207 to insert specific industry standards on 
warranty periods, indemnification terms, time for payment due, or arbitration 
clauses.200  In these cases, party preferences are therefore replaced with 
 
cost of contracting is not in negotiating the fine details of the contract with the store; the cost of contracting is 
finding a store that sells the desired product coupled with the desired contract.”). 
 195 See C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 177 (Iowa 1975) (“[T]he burglary 
‘definition’ which crept into this policy comports neither with the concept a layman might have of that crime, 
nor with a legal interpretation.”). 
 196 See id. at 176 (demonstrating that a term is likely unconscionable “if the adhering party never had an 
opportunity to read the term, or if it is illegible or otherwise hidden from view”). 
 197 See Radin, Boilerplate Today, supra note 13, at 190 (“Standardization serves customization and vice 
versa.  Uniformity at one level facilitates customization at another.  Uniform terms serve as building blocks in 
a customized document.  But those uniform terms themselves may be composed of building-block clauses 
arranged in a customized way.”). 
 198 See, e.g., Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1579 (10th Cir. 1984) (applying the 
knockout rule such that the “ultimate contract . . . includes those non-conflicting terms and any other terms 
supplied by the U.C.C., including terms incorporated by course of performance (§ 2-208), course of dealing 
(§ 1-205), usage of trade (§ 1-205), and other ‘gap fillers’ or ‘off-the-rack’ terms”). 
 199 Id. 
 200 See Dresser Indus., Inc., Waukesha Engine Div. v. Gradall Co., 965 F.2d 1442, 1452 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(stating that “the district court acted appropriately in allowing the jury to consider the parties’ course of 
performance, course of dealing, and usage in the trade” because plaintiff’s warranty provision reflected 
common business practice); Vulcan Auto. Equip., Ltd. v. Global Marine Engine & Parts, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 
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industry standards.  This can best be understood as enforcing the standard deal 
in the industry at the expense of individuated preferences: a protection of the 
information costs inherent in the standard deal. 
Note that consent is not a factor in these considerations: the parties have 
not, and should not, read each others’ purchase orders or order confirmations.  
Although the battle of the forms is most commonly a business-to-business 
issue, it falls under the categorization of high-volume, non-negotiated 
transactions.  Businesses ordering supplies should not scrutinize order forms 
with any more frequency than other purchasers of goods. 
e. Limited Corporate Forms 
Another example of the numerus clausus in contract law comes from 
corporate law.  A business may only take one of a constrained set of legal 
forms.  Corporations, limited liability partnerships, and other legally defined 
business associations present a standardized face to the public, declaring the 
extent of limited liability protection.201 
Again, information-cost theory can be used to explain why the law 
recognizes only the particular forms.  A primary function of corporate forms is 
to standardize the relationship between the corporation and the public (in terms 
of limited liability) and the relationship between shareholders and 
management.202  The standardization of management–shareholder relationships 
is necessary to sell chunks of that relationship (in the form of stock) on 
consumer stock markets.203  If we accept that efficient stock trading best serves 
 
156, 165–66 (D.R.I. 2003) (“The Official Comment to subsection (1) explains that a reasonable time depends 
upon the circumstances surrounding the contractual relationship.  This Court, therefore, finds that a reasonable 
time for payment in this case is sixty days.”); Titanium Metals Corp. v. Elkem Mgmt., Inc., 191 F.R.D. 468, 
470 (W.D. Pa. 1998) (allowing evidence that indemnification is non-standard in smelting industry, the court 
held “that usage of trade, if proven, is a valid gap-filler under UCC § 2-207(3)”); Flender Corp. v. Tippins 
Int’l, Inc., 830 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (knocking out the arbitration clause as contrary to 
industry practice (citing Daitom, 741 F.2d at 1579)). 
 201 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 
387, 390 (2000) (listing the various corporate forms). 
 202 See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The Contract Clause and the Corporation, 55 BROOK. L. 
REV. 767, 770 (1989) (“[S]tate corporation statutes . . . enforce corporate contracts, reduce the costs of private 
contracting by creating standard corporate forms that the parties can opt into, and provide central notice to 
potential creditors that the firm has adopted limited liability.”). 
 203 See Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm, 28 
J.L. & ECON. 179, 180 (1985) (“Each state’s corporate law provides a basic legal framework that governs the 
relations of investors with senior managers, directors, and controlling shareholders.  Through the law of 
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all collective interests (shareholders, management, public, and corporate), then 
it makes sense for the terms of the relationship between management and 
shareholders to be standardized before being chopped up and sold as securities.  
Even if the entity does not offer stock, standardization of the corporate form 
standardizes the risks involved in buying the entity’s debt, or in securitizing the 
entity’s accounts or other rights to payment.204 
2. Standardization Through Anti-Standardization Doctrines 
The prior subsection demonstrated that numerous legal rules constrain the 
range of contractual choice and limit individuated negotiation.  This subsection 
now advances that argument one step further to argue that courts use anti-
standardization doctrines to standardize industry agreements. 
Adhesion and unconscionability serve as the primary anti-standardization 
doctrines in contract law.  Unconscionability has two parts: procedural and 
substantive.205  Procedural unconscionability derives either from ostensible 
differences in bargaining power, or the hiding of surprising terms in prolix 
documents.206  Substantive unfairness can reflect a range of concerns, from a 
price that is several standard deviations from the mean, to consequences of 
breach (such as cross-collateralization and repossession or foreclosure) that are 
widely disproportionate to the value of the contract.207  A procedural flaw must 
result in substantive unfairness in order for the court to rewrite the 
document.208  A contract of adhesion is one which “adheres” to a deal—a 
 
fiduciary duties, which proscribes theft and specifies standards of care and loyalty, corporate law serves as a 
standard form contract that substitutes for costly, fully contingent agency contracts.”). 
 204 See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 202, at 770. 
 205 See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005) (“To briefly recapitulate the 
principles of unconscionability, the doctrine has both a procedural and a substantive element, the former 
focusing on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on overly harsh or one-sided 
results.” (citation omitted)). 
 206 See Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344, 363 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“[T]he contract 
readily comported with the unfair surprise element of procedural unconscionability, i.e., supposedly agreed-
upon terms that are hidden in a prolix printed form and never brought to the attention of the weaker party.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 207 See, e.g., Maxwell v. Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc., 902 P.2d 51 (Ariz. 1995) (finding contract for sale of a 
solar water heater presented a question of unconscionability when the heater was never properly installed, the 
loans were collateralized by the purchaser’s house, and the loans carried an interest rate of 19.5%). 
 208 See True Light Christian Ministries Church v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 809 N.E.2d 1198, 1201 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (“In order for a contract provision to be unconscionable, there must exist both 
‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’ unconscionability.  Substantive unconscionability exists when the contract 
terms are determined to be unfair and unreasonable.”). 
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standardized agreement that is a mandatory portion of a commercial 
transaction.209 
Standardized documents are often termed “take it or leave it,” and 
consumers who sign such documents are held to have lacked sufficient 
bargaining power to consent to the agreement.  Further, courts often find that 
standardized agreements are hard to read, and theorize that consumers should 
and will read simpler and clearer documents.210  As a result, standardized 
contracts are often disfavored under unconscionability analysis.  Some courts 
even view standardized contracts as per se procedurally unconscionable 
because the contract is not the result of a bargaining process.211  This makes 
sense if negotiated consent is indispensable to the legal view of contract.  
Standardized contracts do not result in dickered bargains.  But if one shifts the 
focus of contract law from securing maximum consent to securing efficient 
outcomes, the unconscionability attack on standardized contracts seems 
decreasingly useful. 
Standardized documents are easier to read, to search for, and to search 
within than individually negotiated agreements.212  Consumers can enter 
standardized contracts with confidence that they know what is in them, based 
on prior experience.  There is a further problem with castigating standardized 
contracts as take-it-or-leave-it.  Such documents offer a choice: the consumer 
may take her business elsewhere.  Even if there is no competitor, the consumer 
may choose to refuse the deal entirely.  Substantive unconscionability fares 
little better.  Substantive unfairness is almost never determined in absolute 
 
 209 See Comb v. Paypal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 210 See Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (“An unexpected 
clause often appears in the boilerplate of a printed form and, if read at all, is often not understood.”); Gatton, 
61 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 363 (emphasizing that the terms were unconscionable because they were hidden). 
 211 See Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1282 (9th Cir. 2006) (“When the weaker party is 
presented the clause and told to ‘take it or leave it’ without the opportunity for meaningful negotiation, 
oppression, and therefore procedural unconscionability, are present.” (citation omitted)); Comb, 218 F. Supp. 
2d at 1172 (“A contract or clause is procedurally unconscionable if it is a contract of adhesion . . . .  A contract 
of adhesion, in turn, is a standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining 
strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.” (citation 
omitted)); Martinez v. Master Prot. Corp., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 663, 668 (Cal Ct. App. 2004) (“An arbitration 
agreement that is an essential part of a ‘take it or leave it’ employment condition, without more, is 
procedurally unconscionable.” (citation omitted)). 
 212 See Fairfield, supra note 97, at 1283 (“Rather, third parties gain from lower search costs outside of 
litigation: The resulting unification of language makes it easier for parties to determine whether they can get 
what they want without engaging in costly negotiation.”). 
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terms.  Rather, courts will look to the relative unfairness of the term against the 
backdrop of the industry.213 
These persistent difficulties with unconscionability analysis can be 
resolved by resort to information theory.  I posit that courts are often not using 
unconscionability analysis to target standard terms or standardized contracts.  
A contract that truly reflects the industry standard—and thus is the most 
standardized—is generally safe from unconscionability attack.214  Rather, 
courts use the doctrines of adhesion and unconscionability to protect standard 
deals by striking outlier terms or deals.  Courts do not strike prices or interest 
rates as unconscionable merely because the rate or price is high.  A high rate or 
price that reflects the industry standard is not unconscionable.215  For example, 
the Ninth Circuit determined that high interest rates are “not unusual for loans 
made to high-risk borrowers”;216 and the Connecticut Supreme Court held that 
loans are not unconscionable where “the interest rates . . . charged [on the 
loans was not] beyond the ordinary charges then prevailing in the secondary 
loan market.”217 
By comparison, courts strike prices and interest rates that are statistical 
outliers from the rate prevailing on similar purchases or loans.218  The 
background common law rule is that courts will not inquire into the adequacy 
of consideration.219  Yet, price unconscionability is a common and successful 
 
 213 See infra notes 214–18. 
 214 See, e.g., Reznor v. J. Artist Mgmt., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 2d 565, 577 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that there 
was “no . . . evidence that the objected-to provisions in the . . . agreement were unusual for the industry”); 
Fotomat Corp. of Fla. v. Chanda, 464 So.2d 626, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (asserting that “the limitation 
of liability provision was standard in the industry . . . [and t]his is clearly a commercially reasonable 
consideration”); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 970 P.2d 803, 812 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) 
(“Such clauses are standard in the software industry.  Indeed, they are useful in making software affordable.”); 
cf. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960) (holding that where all American car 
manufacturers used the same warranty terms, the customer could not shop around for better terms). 
 215 See, e.g., Retail Credit Corp. v. Shorterage, No. 69465, 1996 WL 199831, at *1–*2 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Apr. 25, 1996) (“In determining . . . substantive unconscionability, this court must consider the interest rates 
which have been held to be ‘commercially reasonable.’”); Cal. Grocers Ass’n v. Bank of Am., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
396, 402 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (“Bank of America’s $3 DIR fee is actually at the low end of prices 
charged . . . by other financial institutions, many of which charge between $4 and $10.”). 
 216 Brown v. Investors Mortgage Co., 121 F.3d 472, 478 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 217 Cheshire Mortgage Serv., Inc. v. Montes, 612 A.2d 1130, 1137–38 (Conn. 1992). 
 218 See, e.g., Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal. Rptr. 845, 849 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (“We have little trouble 
concluding that an interest rate of 200 percent . . . is substantively unconscionable . . . .  [T]he interest 
rate . . . was approximately ten times the rate then prevailing in the credit market for similar loans.”). 
 219 For a comprehensive treatment of consideration and gross price disparity in unconscionability, see 
Frank P. Darr, Unconscionability and Price Fairness, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1819, 1822 (1994) (“[T]he successful 
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claim.220  Contracts selling overpriced goods are regularly struck as 
unconscionable.221  In determining whether the good is overpriced, courts can 
only look at similar goods in the market.  Thus, the measure of 
unconscionability is not absolute, but is determined by deviation from the 
industry standard. 
Price unconscionability cases demonstrate the strength of information-cost 
analysis over informed consent analysis.  If cases were determined based on 
informed consent, then grossly overpriced contracts would surely be enforced.  
“Of all the terms in a contract, the one most assuredly understood by the buyer 
is the price term.”222  It is easier to understand why courts engage in price 
evaluation by looking at information costs.  In many cases the price is 
packaged in such a way that makes it costly for consumers to decipher the true 
cost they will ultimately pay.223  For example, it may be time-costly for 
consumers to determine the ultimate cost of a good over installment payments. 
Even where prices are prominently displayed, significant deviation from 
the standard price still creates information costs for third parties.  Recall that 
under information-cost theory, the actual parties to the contract are aware of 
idiosyncratic terms.  A given contract term, including price, may be efficient as 
between two parties.  But third parties will suffer costs created by an 
agreement that deviates from the standard.  Even if any given price term is 
fully disclosed to the parties to that particular deal, price volatility across the 
run of deals causes third parties to incur search costs. 
 
price unconscionability cases run headlong into a bedrock contract ‘rule’ that the courts will not address the 
adequacy of consideration supporting an agreement.”). 
 220 Id. at 1822–23. 
 221 Id. at 1850–61 (citing Murphy v. McNamara, 416 A.2d 170, 173 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979)) (rent to own 
contract that called for consumer to be charged $1,268 for a television worth $499); Sho-Pro of Ind., Inc. v. 
Brown, 585 N.E.2d 1357, 1361 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (windows sold for approximately four times their cost); 
Howard v. Dialosa, 574 A.2d 995, 997 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1990) (home worth $150,000 sold for $25,000); Toker 
v. Westerman, 274 A.2d 78, 79 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1970) ($400 freezer sold for $1,230); Vom Lehn v. Astor Art 
Galleries, Ltd., 380 N.Y.S.2d 532, 534, 538 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (art sold for $67,000 with a fair market value 
of only $14,750); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 265 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) ($300 freezer sold 
for $1,440)). 
 222 Id. at 1822. 
 223 Many lending companies offer loans over long periods of time so that each payment is low compared 
to the amount borrowed.  For example, Cash Call, http://www.cashcallmortgage.com/Pages/SiteRedirect.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2009), offers a $2,600 loan (minus a $75 “loan fee”) for 42 payments of $216.55, or 
$9,095.10 in total.  See also Murphy, 416 A.2d at 173 (discussing a $499 television sold for $1,268 and that 
the “agreement provided for weekly payments of $16, and further provided that if the plaintiff paid that sum 
for seventy-eight successive one-week terms, she would become the owner of the television set”). 
FAIRFIELD GALLEYFINAL 6/2/2009  12:28:13 PM 
2009] THE COST OF CONSENT 1449 
For example, courts accept that payday loan rates are higher, as an industry, 
than regular bank rates.  However, if even one payday loan lender charges 
idiosyncratic prices far in excess of the current payday loan standard, then 
contracting prices for everyone in the industry will rise.  Now every consumer 
must not only calculate her own interest rate, but must compare it to at least 
one other lender in order to be sure that her rate is standard.  A loan shopper 
must now do research to ensure that she does not fall victim to the bad apple.  
One excessive rate in a barrel of competitive rates ruins the benefits of 
standardization for everyone.  Because this extra search cost is now tacked 
onto every loan, the number of loans will fall and the industry as a whole will 
suffer. 
If goods have a standard market price, consumers purchase without the 
need to inquire whether the vendor they are patronizing offers the best deal.224  
The deviation between the price of gasoline offered at your local gas station 
and the best price in town is likely to be small enough to make researching the 
question (or driving around to find out) unprofitable.225  Of course, as the 
differences between gas prices rose during the recent price shock, the value of 
driving around looking for a better price rose.  Thus, if price differences 
between vendors are high, parties incur information costs shopping for the best 
deal, rather than dealing with the most convenient vendor.  Consequently, the 
law recognizes that standard prices are valuable.  Indeed, the U.C.C. does not 
even require a price term to form an enforceable contract.226  Parties routinely 
order without reference to price terms.  Thus, the court will supply the 
industry’s standard market price as a default price term.227 
Courts also touch on the benefits of standardization in their discussions of 
contractual surprise.  The traditional view is that parties cannot consent to 
terms of which they are unaware.  A surprising term is unconscionable.228  Yet 
courts limit this principle by reference to reasonable expectations.229  A term 
 
 224 See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The 
Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1401–29 (1983) (showing that, just as 
with price diversity where consumers prefer one price, the variety of contract terms can affect consumer search 
costs). 
 225 Id. at 1401 (“[P]rice diversity can exist when it is costly for consumers to inform themselves of the 
prices that different firms charge even though all consumers prefer the same price.”). 
 226 U.C.C. §§ 2-201, 1-205 (2002). 
 227 § 1-205. 
 228 See Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (“The first concept 
of unconscionability which we shall examine may be classified under the rubric of ‘unfair surprise.’”). 
 229 Id. (“If the form contains a material, risk-shifting clause which the signer would not reasonably expect 
to encounter in such a transaction, courts have held that the clause may be excised as it is unconscionable.”). 
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that one does not reasonably expect to find in the contract is unenforceable.230  
There is a further consideration, however.  The reasonable expectations are 
defined by the industry standard, not by the contracting parties.  As one court 
noted, “a merchant in a given industry will have, by definition, a difficult time 
establishing either subjective or objective ‘surprise’ regarding a proposed 
contract term that is standard in the industry.”231 
In determining whether a contract term must be struck for unconscionable 
contractual surprise, courts ask whether the term is inside or outside of the 
norm for the industry.232  If the term is outside the norm, the court finds the 
term unconscionable due to surprise.233  If it is within the norm, the term is 
enforceable despite the “subjective or objective” surprise of the contracting 
parties.234  Under traditional contract theory, this result is hard to explain.  The 
parties’ intent ought to govern contract terms.  However, under information-
cost theory, this formulation of contractual surprise makes sense.  A term that 
is surprising to the industry as a whole raises contracting costs to the industry 
as a whole.  Courts will enforce an industry’s standard term even though it is 
surprising to a contracting party.  The surprise of an industry weighs more 
heavily than the surprise of a single contracting party. 
Nor is this analysis limited to the doctrines of unconscionability and 
contracts of adhesion.  Courts applying consumer protection laws or 
determining unfair trade practices also enforce standardized agreements and 
attack outlier contract terms.235  Standard deals are almost never deemed 
unfair.  But courts find that terms which “substantially deviate from industry-
wide practice” constitute unfair trade practices.236  Indeed, the texts of state 
consumer protection statutes make this explicit.237  Such statutes decline to set 
 
 230 Id. 
 231 Aceros Prefabricados v. TradeArbed, Inc., 282 F.3d 92, 101 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 232 Compare Germantown Mfg. Co., 491 A.2d at 146 (striking a non-standard clause), with Aceros 
Prefabricados, 282 F.3d at 101 (upholding a standard contract term). 
 233 See Germantown Mfg. Co., 491 A.2d at 146. 
 234 See Aceros Prefabricados, 282 F.3d at 101. 
 235 See Weigel v. Ron Tonkin Chevrolet Co., 690 P.2d 488, 493 (Or. 1984) (“The civil action authorized 
by ORS 646.638 is designed to encourage private enforcement of the prescribed standards of trade and 
commerce . . . .”). 
 236 See Frank Lopez, Using the Fair Housing Act to Combat Predatory Lending, 6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. 
& POL’Y 73, 80 n.43 (1999) (“[L]oan fees which ‘substantially deviate from industry-wide practice’ may 
constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice in violation of Massachusetts regulations” (citing United Cos. 
Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 209 (D. Mass. 1998))). 
 237 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-1119(c) (West 2006) (“[T]o support a finding of 
unconscionability, there must be evidence of some . . . absence of meaningful choice for one of the parties, 
together with contract terms that are, under standard industry practices, unreasonably favorable to the equity 
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their own metric for unfairness, but instead penalize contract terms that deviate 
from the industry standard. 
Information-cost theory provides a new and better way to view these 
longstanding questions of contract law.  Customized contracts impose 
information externalities on third parties.  Standardized contracts reduce 
consumers’ information costs.  Courts that adopt rules encouraging 
information exchange therefore ought to consider the effect of such exchanges 
on third parties.  An idiosyncratic deal may be efficient for two, but inefficient 
for the rest of the industry.  Despite court rhetoric disfavoring standardized 
agreements, some courts protect standardized deals by using anti-
standardization doctrines to strike outlier terms.  The same principle applies to 
contract interpretation.  Although courts claim to determine the meaning of the 
contract by reference to the parties’ intent, courts sub silentio consider the 
impact of contract interpretation on the industry that relies on a standard deal, 
and often favor the industry interpretation over the idiosyncratic agreement of 
the parties. 
IV.  CHALLENGES: STANDARDIZATION AND INNOVATION 
I have thus far argued that consent is costly, that standardization lowers 
those costs, and that courts should and do use contract doctrine to constrain the 
range of customization in mass-market contracts.  There is a significant 
challenge, however, to this view.  Would such constraints hinder innovation in 
contract law? 
This Part argues that standardization fosters innovation.  In the industrial 
context, standardization often permits innovation, by breaking problems down 
into manageable chunks.238  I argue that standardization facilitates innovation 
in contract just as it does in the industrial context.  Customization is not 
 
purchaser or associate.”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-2004(2)(b)(i) (2007) (requiring independent certification 
for debt managers to “ensure[] compliance with industry standards and best practices”); 66 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 2203 (West 1999) (“In adopting the standards, the commission shall consider the absence of any 
applicable industry standards and practices or adopt standards in conformity with industry standards and 
practices . . . .”). 
 238 See Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, in BOILERPLATE: 
THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS, supra note 13, at 164 (“Modularity is beneficial in that it makes 
complexity manageable by allowing multiple people to work on a larger problem, often in very specialized 
ways, without incurring the costs of intense communication.  Modularity also creates options in the sense that 
it allows a system to manage uncertainty; because each module can function and develop in relative isolation, 
these processes can occur without the need to resolve uncertainty elsewhere in the system.”). 
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synonymous with innovation, nor is standardization synonymous with 
stagnation. 
A. Micro-Modularity 
When any system becomes complex, humans cannot work on the whole 
thing at once.239  If each adjustment to any given part causes a cascade of other 
changes throughout the whole, the problem becomes impossible to work on.  
The problem must be broken down into parts, and the interaction between parts 
must be constrained.240  Each part can then be worked on separately.  
Moreover, components must be standardized in how they interact with the 
whole, so that each can be removed and replaced with another.241  Imagine the 
difficulty of working on a car engine that did not use standardized parts.  You 
could not fix the engine without re-crafting the customized parts. 
This process of limiting the interaction between part and whole, and of 
standardizing the components, is called modularization.242  Components are 
called modules.243  Modules can be removed and replaced without affecting the 
whole.  When a system is modularized, a change to one part of the system does 
not spill over into other parts of a system.244  From spark plugs to object-
oriented programming, modularity spurs innovation.245 
Standardization constrains the range of customization, in order to lower 
information costs.  Here we see that these lower information costs also serve 
innovation, by making it possible to fix part of a problem without having to 
draft an entirely new and customized contract.  It is true that switching a 
module will raise information costs, in the sense that one will have to inquire 
which module is being used in a given system.  This is like a prospective 
 
 239 See id. at 165 (“[H]uman understanding of any system is enhanced by breaking it up . . . into 
modules.”). 
 240 Id. at 164. 
 241 Id. at 165 (“Forming a modular system in involves partially closing off some parts of the system and 
allowing these encapsulated components to interconnect only in certain ways.  This allows work to go on in 
parallel and facilitates certain kinds of innovation and evolution for a simple reason: Adjustment can happen 
within modules without causing major ripple effects.”). 
 242 See id. at 164 (“Modularity is a device that deals with complexity by decomposing a complex system 
into pieces (modules), in which communications . . . are intense within the module but sparse and standardized 
across modules.”). 
 243 Id. 
 244 Id. at 165 (“Adjustment can happen within modules without causing major ripple effects.”). 
 245 See Radin, Boilerplate Today, supra note 13, at 189 (“Modularity became important to physical 
architecture in the first part of the twentieth century and to the virtual architecture of computer science in the 
later twentieth century.”). 
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purchaser looking under the hood of a car to ensure that the engine used is 
indeed the one advertised.  But the process of looking is much less costly if 
engines are standardized than if each one is custom-crafted.  Looking under the 
hood and seeing a V8 engine tells you something.  Looking under the hood at a 
custom-built engine tells you less. 
Contracts have become increasingly modularized.  Each section is set out 
under a separate heading.  A severability clause limits the interaction of the 
part with the whole.  If one section is removed, the rest of the contract still 
functions.246  Modularity of contracts permits contract drafters to swap in 
components without redrafting the entire contract.  That is doubtless a 
significant savings.  But the rewards to consumers of component 
standardization are far greater.  Consumers can search for the standardized 
contractual component they desire.  By analogy, a search on eBay for “V8 
engine” yields Jaguars, Fords, and Chevrolets, each containing the desired 
component.  The standardization of contract components decreases the cost of 
searching for the desired deal. 
B. Macro-Modularity 
Standardized terms within a contract are not the only method of reducing 
information costs in contract language.  Entire contracts can be standardized.  
This section argues that constraint of contract language, standardization, and 
modularity plays significant roles in limiting information costs and fostering 
innovation across contracts as well. 
In contract law, the concept of industry is a tool to standardize, and thus 
modularize, contracts.247  For example, consider the rule that contracts from 
within the same industry are given similar construction.248  A smelting contract 
is construed differently from a construction contract, even when the same 
words are used.249  Courts draw from a given constrained context in construing 
 
 246 See Smith, supra note 238, at 169 (“With [a severability] term in place, the validity of each provision 
in the contract can be considered in isolation of other provisions.  Here, as in many systems, modularity 
insulates the system as a whole from the failure of one part.”). 
 247 See Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Richards Mfg. Co., No. Civ. 01-4677, 2006 WL 902148, at *15 (D.N.J. 
Apr. 4, 2006) (“[T]he relevant inquiry—whether or not the information at issue is commonly known in the 
industry—must be directed to the parties’ competitors.”). 
 248 See, e.g., Ragus v. City of Chi., 628 N.E.2d 999, 999–1002 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
 249 Compare Titanium Metals Corp. v. Elkem Mgmt., Inc., 191 F.R.D. 468, 470 (W.D. Pa. 1998) 
(indicating that indemnification is non-standard in smelting industry), with Metric Constr. Co. v. U.S., 1 Cl. Ct. 
383, 399 (1983) (allowing evidence that industry standard for indemnification was 50% of anticipated profits). 
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a contract.250  This prevents spillover from one context to another, and allows 
parties to craft standardized contracts, on a per-industry basis, that respond to 
the needs of that particular industry.251  Within an industry, one contract’s 
terms affect another because they feed into the pool of common language.  
When a court construes a contract, it construes all contracts in that industry, 
giving them a standardized meaning.252 
When a new kind of contract is needed, it does not evolve through a line-
by-line process of customization.  Rather, new contracts can emerge as a block 
whole, a standardized contract for a new industry.253  An example drawn from 
an emerging industry may help.  Social networking sites and virtual worlds are 
governed by contract law.254  Those contracts began as basic software licenses 
or website terms of use.255  However, online communities faced social 
problems as well as software license issues.256  Thus, the End User License 
Agreements needed to control social behavior (e.g., the behavior of one 
MySpace member toward another) rather than merely behavior that might 
affect the market for copyrighted material.257  The preexisting software license 
terms did not solve these social problems.258  Online community providers 
needed new contracts to deal with these new issues.259 
 
 250 See Stender v. Twin City Foods, Inc., 510 P.2d 221, 225 (Wash. 1973) (noting that the          
“definition . . . must be determined in light of reasonable industry custom and usage . . . even though words in 
their ordinary or legal meaning are unambiguous”). 
 251 See Thomas & Betts Corp., 2006 WL 902148, at *15. 
 252 See, e.g., Ragus, 628 N.E.2d at 999–1002 (construing terms of contract to comport with industry 
custom and practice). 
 253 Note the similarities between End User License Agreements in virtual worlds.  See Entropia, 
https://account.entropiauniverse.com/pe/en/rich/107004.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (retaining all title and 
rights to all objects and virtual items and specifically denying any ownership by the user); Second Life, http:// 
secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (owning all data stored on its servers); World of 
Warcraft, http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/legal/eula.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (claiming ownership 
and rights to all characters, names, dialog, sounds, animations, and anything else within the world); cf. Bragg 
v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 606 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding procedural unconscionability in 
Second Life’s Terms of Service arbitration agreement, because it was “the first and only virtual world to 
specifically grant its participants property rights in virtual land”). 
 254 See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Anti-Social Contracts: The Contractual Governance of Virtual Worlds, 53 
MCGILL L.J. 427 (2008) [hereinafter Fairfield, Anti-Social Contracts]. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. 
 257 See id. at 429. 
 258 Id. 
 259 Id. 
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These new contracts did not evolve line-by-line.  Rather, the contracts 
emerged as a block.260  Even though the novel terms of the contracts had not 
been tested by courts, the terms were standardized.261  The terms across 
contracts were surprisingly similar for a new industry.  Note that the traditional 
academic explanation for boilerplate—that it permits parties to benefit from a 
private conversation between drafter and court that results in court-approved 
terms—does not seem to explain this situation, in which the standardized 
contracts had not been tested in court. 
Contract innovation does not seem to be constant and organic, but “sticky,” 
and “chunky.”262  For a while, contracts don’t seem to change and are locked 
into court-approved language.  Then a new industry needs a new contract.  A 
new industry is a new box.  Inside the box, industry-specific contracts can be 
developed without regard to spillover to other industries.  Standardization 
within industries constrains customization.  Industry contracts will be 
construed in light of industry custom and practice, even in the face of solid 
unwritten evidence of the parties’ actual intent.263  But these constraints do not 
cause stagnation.  In contract law, as elsewhere, micro-modularity and macro-
modularity make innovation possible.264 
Another way to explain the block emergence of new, standard terms is by 
reference to local and global optima.  A standardized contract within an 
industry is a local optimum: it represents one good mix of information costs 
and features.265  A global optimum (or a superior local optimum) is one that 
represents a better mix of costs, but is costly to achieve in the short term.266  
For example, a slightly better contract may be rejected because the information 
 
 260 See supra note 253 for examples of industry standardized contracts. 
 261 See Fairfield, Anti-Social Contracts, supra note 254, at 438. 
 262 See STAN J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS & MICROSOFT 9 (1999) (“A 
particular kind of network effect occurs as technology develops.  As more firms or households use a 
technology, there is a greater pool of knowledge for users to draw upon.  As we gain experience and 
confidence in a technology, the expected payoff to someone who adopts it may become greater.  Once a few 
people have tried a technology, others know what can be expected.”). 
 263 See supra Part IV.C. 
 264 See infra Part V. 
 265 See Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883, 899 (2002) (describing 
choice of law provisions and the difference between global and local optima, noting that “[i]f the costs and 
benefits of an activity are distributed unevenly across countries, national policies will diverge from the global 
optimum.  The policy of an individual government may be either more or less permissive than the global 
optimum, depending on the distribution of these costs and benefits”). 
 266 Id. (“In certain instances, for example, a globally optimal policy may cause a net loss in one or more 
countries when compared to the noncooperative, suboptimal outcome.  In those cases, the losing countries will 
prefer the suboptimal outcome, frustrating efforts to achieve an efficient international regime.”). 
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costs created by a non-standard agreement are greater than the cost-savings 
generated by standardization.  While standardization savings outweigh the 
benefits of novelty, the old contract remains the standard.  However, when that 
balance tips, the contract will seem not to evolve, but to “snap” to a new 
position: one where the benefit of the novel contract term outweighs the gains 
of standardization.267  Following the snap, information costs will again fall, as 
the new term becomes standard. 
V. PROPOSED CHANGES 
The prior Parts have argued that consent is costly, that standardization 
reduces that cost, and that courts already have some tools to protect standard 
agreements by limiting idiosyncratic terms.  This Part suggests several ways 
courts might change from current practice when dealing with mass-market 
contracts.  The overarching principle is that courts should minimize the cost of 
informed consent by constraining contract language to standard terms, rather 
than ensuring informed consent by redrafting contracts.  Further, courts should 
enforce standard terms because they lower the cost of information, rather than 
disfavor such terms based on some intuition that they raise information costs 
because consumers do not read them. 
Courts should stop treating contractual consent as binary—as existing or 
not existing.  Rather, they should ask how much consent the consumer has 
bought, and whether that is a reasonably efficient amount to buy.  When courts 
use the doctrine of unconscionability to force buyers to buy more information 
than is efficient, they cause the usual economic harms.  Similarly, the term 
“contract of adhesion” is empty of meaning, and its application should be 
reformed.  A contract of adhesion is problematic under liberal contract theory 
because it is a “take it or leave it” bargain that vitiates the consumer’s ability to 
express free will through consent.  But under information theory, a 
standardized agreement reduces the consumer’s information costs.  Thus, to 
the extent courts wish to disfavor standardized agreements, they should 
distinguish not based on “adhesiveness.”  Courts should instead distinguish 
 
 267 See Gaia Bernstein, The Paradoxes of Technological Diffusion: Genetic Discrimination and Internet 
Privacy, 39 CONN. L. REV. 241, 247 (2006) (“Interactive technologies are often characterized by a critical 
mass point quality (and related network effects) where the technology is of little use to the adopter unless a 
critical mass of people adopts it.  Once the critical mass point is reached, diffusion accelerates, social norms 
become quickly entrenched and the technology is less likely to be abandoned.”). 
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between contracts that embody standard terms and documents that attempt to 
hide idiosyncratic terms. 
Courts should stop using the fiction of the consumer who reads, and thus 
consents, to mass-market contracts.  Forcing consumers to buy more 
information than they desire is not a useful goal.  This rhetorical flourish is 
used by courts that feel the need to retain some vestige of contractual consent 
in the mass-market context.  Reading a mass-market contract is an economic 
loss.  It is almost never worth the time it takes.  Courts should cease redrafting 
contracts that no one reads.  Courts, not consumers, are the real readers of 
contracts.  If the court does not understand the contract, then the contract is 
likely to be construed in a way that the drafter does not like.  That is incentive 
enough for the drafter to get it right. 
Courts should be very cautious about adopting information-forcing rules, 
even permissive ones, in the mass-market context.  Information-forcing rules 
encourage the exchange of idiosyncratic information.268  This may be efficient 
in individual deals, but is often inefficient across the range of deals. 
Finally, courts should focus on standardized meanings rather than 
individuated meanings when they construe contracts.  This is different from the 
usual divide between objective and subjective meanings of a term.  When 
courts construe contract terms, they usually understand (although rarely state) 
that the beneficiaries of their labors are subsequent contracting parties.  Thus, 
courts should not only construe terms based on objective evidence, but should 
further give weight to standard meanings of terms.  This could even take the 
form of a presumption against customization in the mass-market context, 
which would be a complete departure from current court practice. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has attempted to shift the central question of contractual 
consent from “does informed consent exist?” to “how much informed consent 
is efficient for the buyer to buy and the seller to sell?”  Along the way, the 
Article has attempted to demonstrate that the usual criticisms of standardized 
contracts are not persuasive, and that some of the information-forcing rules of 
recent literature might be a bad idea. 
 
 268 See Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. Div.). 
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The Article makes a limited argument.  In mass-market contexts, the costs 
of informing consumers of the terms of contracts often outweigh the benefits 
of doing so, and therefore courts should critically reexamine the network of 
doctrines that force companies to make disclosures no consumer ever reads.  In 
so doing, this analysis leaves intact traditional contract doctrine in the 
negotiation-centered setting, where information exchange is a critical part of 
the negotiation process. 
But even this limited argument does much good for harmonizing contract 
law with practice.  Consumers do not read mass-market contracts.  Such 
contracts are routinely standardized and choice is constrained.  Courts should 
understand why, rather than resist.  Under preexisting contract theory, courts 
feel compelled to reform standardized contracts to reflect individual informed 
consent.  Under information-cost theory, standard deals are efficient 
mechanisms that courts should protect. 
Change may be slow in coming.  Even where contract theorists have looked 
at the costs of securing contractual consent, they have endorsed information-
forcing rules that encourage the exchange of idiosyncratic information.  Yet 
even this supposedly efficient exchange does not match contracting practice.  
We do not reveal our secret vulnerabilities to sellers in order to get increased 
insurance, nor do we bargain prices down based on the revelation of secret 
strengths.  One-size-fits-all contracts permit consumers to cheaply compare 
deals, and to enter into deals without inquiring as to what the components of 
the deal are.  Knowing this, sellers do not offer standardized contracts because 
it permits them to reap cost savings.  Sellers offer standardized deals because 
consumers demand them. 
 
